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ABSTRACT  
The international investment law regime has recently been characterized 
as facing a “crisis of legitimacy” and exhibiting “an incumbent lack of 
transparency . . . and legal uncertainty.” This crisis has arisen in large part 
from poor reasoning and real or perceived overreach by international 
investment tribunals, who derive their jurisdictional competence from the 
consent of states and private investors. To bolster the perceived fairness and 
thereby the authority of their decisions, investment tribunals must be vigilant 
about clearly stating their reasoning and explicitly grounding their legal 
analyses in the relevant treaties. In jurisdictional decisions, respect for the 
limits of parties‟ consent to arbitrate must be a fundamental concern of 
arbitrators.  
Investment tribunals frequently face disputes involving continuing acts, 
facts, and situations that appear to have begun before the relevant treaties 
entered into force and continued after that point. When addressing such 
matters, tribunals have borrowed analyses of similar issues from outside 
international investment law. Thus, the question arises whether this 
borrowing is appropriately used to determine jurisdiction based on a 
particular investment treaty with a specific jurisdictional consent clause. Of 
particular concern is investment tribunals‟ adoption of human rights 
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jurisprudence that uses continuing violations to expand temporal 
jurisdiction. 
This paper will examine how investment tribunals have incorporated 
continuing circumstances analysis from human rights and other adjudicatory 
bodies. It will evaluate whether it is ever possible for investment arbitrators 
to appropriately use such “precedent” in their jurisdictional analyses and 
whether they have applied it correctly in particular awards. Continuing 
circumstances issues arise under two different categories of temporal 
restrictions, each serving distinct purposes. The first category of restrictions 
excludes from jurisdiction acts, facts, situations, or disputes occurring before 
the treaty entered into force. The second category of restrictions prescribes a 
limited time after breach within which a party can bring a particular claim. 
To determine whether continuing circumstances analysis has been and can 
be properly applied in investment arbitration, one must consider the specific 
language and purpose of the relevant treaty‟s temporal limitations. Thus, this 
Article examines the two types of restrictions separately, considering their 
purposes and examining in detail how international tribunals have analyzed 
continuing circumstances under each. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The international investment law regime has recently been characterized 
as facing a legitimacy crisis
1
 and exhibiting ―an incumbent lack of 
transparency, differentiation, partial contradiction and legal uncertainty.‖2 
This crisis has arisen in large part from poor reasoning and real or perceived 
overreach by international investment tribunals, whose jurisdictional 
competence is based completely on the consent of states and private 
investors.
3
 In carefully negotiated and drafted agreements, states limit the 
 
 
 1. See Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin, The Backlash 
Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, in The BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY xxxvii, xxxvii (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-Hwa 
Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010); James Crawford, Foreword to ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS, at xxi (2009); Charles N. Brower, Michael Ottolenghi 
& Peter Prows, The Saga of CMS: Res Judicata, Precedent, and the Legitimacy of ICSID Arbitration, 
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH 
SCHREUER 843, 845 (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch & Stephan Wittich eds., 
2009); Charles N. Brower, A Crisis of Legitimacy, NAT‘L L.J., Oct. 7, 2002, at B9.  
 2. MARIEL DIMSEY, THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND ARBITRATION 98 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 2008). 
 3. See NICK GALLUS, THE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION TREATIES 27 
(2008); Andrea J. Menaker, What the Explosion of Investor-State Arbitrations May Portend for the 
Future of BITs, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 157, 161–63 (Catherine A. Rogers & 
Roger P. Alford eds., 2009); see also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States art. 25 (Oct. 14, 1966) (establishing the jurisdiction of ICSID and 
giving states parties the right to limit their consent to arbitrate investment disputes even after ratifying 
the Convention), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-
final.pdf; Press Release, International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Ecuador‘s 
Notification Under Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention (Dec. 5, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ 
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categories of disputes they consent to submit to jurisdiction. For example, 
temporal limitations may exclude ongoing disputes or future disputes based 
on pre-treaty events. To bolster the authority and perceived fairness of their 
decisions, investment tribunals should clearly state their reasoning and 
explicitly ground their analyses in the relevant treaty. Clear reasoning and 
express basis in the relevant treaty are particularly important in jurisdictional 
decisions to demonstrate respect for the limits states set on their consent to 
arbitration.  
Temporal jurisdiction has long been a source of contention between states 
in international adjudication. The language of temporal jurisdiction 
provisions is often ambiguous. Additionally, ongoing acts, facts, and 
situations—that is, ―continuing circumstances‖4—present difficulties. Parties 
to arbitration often dispute whether a continuing circumstance is within the 
tribunal‘s jurisdiction. Disagreements also arise over whether a circumstance 
is in fact continuing or instead, whether a series of individual situations or 
disputes has occurred, some within jurisdiction and others outside. 
International tribunals have faced such questions for over a century and have 
developed a jurisprudence of continuing circumstances. 
International investment tribunals have invoked continuing circumstances 
analysis developed in other areas of international law to find that they have 
jurisdiction over acts that appear on their face to have occurred outside the 
temporal scope of the relevant treaty. They have also used continuing 
circumstances analysis to find that they do not have jurisdiction when they 
might at first appear to. Given the importance of respecting the limits of 
consent to arbitration, the question arises whether it is appropriate for 
investment arbitration tribunals to apply continuing circumstances analysis 
from outside international investment law.
5
 Particular concerns have been 
raised about investment tribunals‘ adoption of human rights jurisprudence 
that uses continuing violations to expand temporal jurisdiction.
6
  
This Article will examine how investment tribunals have incorporated 
continuing circumstances analysis developed by human rights and other 
                                                                                                                         
 
ICSID/Index.jsp (click on ―Publications‖; select ―News Releases‖; then select link for news release of 
Dec. 5, 2007) (notifying ICSID, pursuant to Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention, that it withdraws 
consent to arbitrate investment disputes pertaining to investments in natural resources, such as oil, gas, 
and minerals). 
 4. This Article uses the phrase ―continuing circumstances‖ to refer generally to all types of 
continuing behavior and situations that arise in international cases—including continuing facts, acts, 
situations, and disputes. 
 5. Cf. BG Group PLC v. Republic of Arg. (U.K. v. Arg.), Final Award, ¶ 408 (Dec. 24, 2007) 
(questioning whether principles of customary international law apply to investor-state disputes). 
 6. See Merrill & Ring v. Canada, Opinion of W. Michael Reisman with Respect to the Effect of 
NAFTA Article 1116(2) on Merrill & Ring‘s Claim, ¶¶ 45–51 (Apr. 22, 2008). 
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adjudicatory bodies and will evaluate whether this incorporation has been 
executed appropriately. It will also evaluate whether it is ever legitimate for 
investment tribunals to incorporate such ―precedent‖ into their jurisdictional 
analyses. Continuing circumstances issues arise under two categories of 
treaty provisions restricting jurisdiction, each serving distinct purposes. One 
category of provisions excludes from jurisdiction acts, facts, situations, or 
disputes occurring before the treaty entered into force. The other category of 
provisions prescribes a limited time after a breach within which a party can 
bring a particular claim. To determine whether continuing circumstances 
analysis has been and can be properly applied in investment arbitration, the 
purpose of the underlying treaties‘ temporal restrictions must be considered. 
Therefore, this Article examines the two types of restriction separately, 
considering their purposes and examining in detail how international 
tribunals have analyzed continuing circumstances under each.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the consensual basis of 
investment arbitration and identifies legal authority for arbitrators‘ use of 
sources of law outside the relevant investment treaty for interpretative 
guidance. Part III examines continuing circumstances under treaty provisions 
that exclude from jurisdiction facts, acts, situations, or disputes that began 
before the treaty entered into force. Part IV examines continuing 
circumstances as they interact with treaty-mandated periods of limitation. 
Part V concludes by discussing the legitimacy crisis in international 
investment law and proposing a principle to guide investment arbitrators in 
the proper use of outside sources of law to interpret jurisdictional consent 
clauses. 
II. CONSENT: THE BASIS OF INVESTMENT TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION 
Tribunals convened under the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which hear most investor-state arbitrations, 
obtain jurisdiction by consent of the state and investor parties to the 
arbitration, as specified in Article 25 of the International Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
7
 To grant an ICSID-sanctioned 
tribunal jurisdiction over a dispute, a state must have agreed, in addition to 
signing the ICSID Convention, to submit the specific dispute or a class of 
 
 
 7. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 25 (Oct. 14, 1966). 
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disputes.
8
 The instrument of consent may be a bilateral investment treaty 
(BIT) (most commonly), a multilateral treaty, or an agreement between a 
State and an individual investor.
9
 Nothing in the ICSID Convention prevents 
parties from circumscribing their consent to a subset of disputes, and parties 
often do limit their consent in this way. Many investment treaties limit 
consent to arbitration to disputes arising after the treaty‘s entry into force,10 
or—even more restrictively—to disputes based on factual circumstances 
arising after the treaty‘s entry into force.11  
Under the principle of consent, a tribunal should seek to ascertain and 
apply the shared intention of the parties to the relevant agreement regarding 
what disputes are within the tribunal‘s jurisdiction. As Professor W. Michael 
Reisman has described: 
In international law, the basic theory of arbitration is simple and rather 
elegant. Arbitral jurisdiction is entirely consensual. As in Roman law 
and the systems influenced by it, arbitration is a creature of contract. 
The arbitrator‘s powers are derived from the parties‘ contract. Hence, 
in the classic sense, an arbitrator is not entitled to do anything 
unauthorized by the parties: arbiter nihil extra compromissum facere 
potest. . . . [A] purported award which is accomplished in ways 
inconsistent with the shared contractual expectations of the parties is 
something to which they had not agreed. The arbitrator has exceeded 
his power or, to use the technical term, committed an excès de 
pouvoir. If the allegation of such an excess can be sustained, the 
putative award is null, and may be ignored by the ―losing‖ party.12 
 
 
 8. Id. art. 25(1) (―The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State . . . and a national of another Contracting State, 
which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.‖). 
 9. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES: 2.3 CONSENT TO ARBITRATION 11–24, 
UNCTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2 (2003). 
 10. See, e.g., Convenio entre el Gobierno de la República de Chile y el Gobierno de la República 
del Perú para la promoción y protección recíproca de las inversiones [Agreement between the 
Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government of the Republic of Peru for the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments] art. 2, Feb. 2, 2000, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ 
BITS/chiper_s.asp [hereinafter Peru-Chile BIT] (―This Treaty shall apply to investments made before 
or after its entry into force . . . . It shall not, however, apply to differences or disputes that arose prior 
to its entry into force.‖). 
 11. See Industria Nacional de Alimentos, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 94 (Sept. 5, 2007) (discussing single versus double exclusion clauses).  
 12. W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 739, 745.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol10/iss3/2
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Often, however, the shared intention of the parties is not obvious from the 
instrument of consent. A question that comes up repeatedly in ICSID 
arbitration is whether the dispute at issue falls within the temporal scope of 
the parties‘ consent to arbitration. When the answer cannot be determined 
from the instrument(s) of consent, where is the appropriate place to look for 
interpretive guidance?  
One interpretive approach is to determine a default rule, which presumes 
that silence on a matter correlates to a particular intention. Alan Scott Rau 
and Edward F. Sherman have pointed out that default rules, which assert, ―‗if 
it had been the parties‘ intention to [x], they would have so provided in their 
contracts,‘ [are] nothing more than an extravagant form of question-
begging.‖13 Rau and Sherman suggest that the goal of a default rule is to 
―most closely mimic[] the ‗hypothetical bargain‘ that the parties themselves 
would have chosen in a completely spelled-out agreement . . . .‖14 Given the 
difficulty of determining this position, a default rule might instead seek to 
mimic the bargain that similarly situated parties or rational parties would 
have chosen ex ante.
15
 Even this approach seems speculative at best, 
particularly if attempted without regard to the context in which the agreement 
was made.  
Another way to discern the intent of ambiguous treaty language is to look 
at the broad context in which the words were written. Context can also aid in 
determining a more plausible default rule. Such context includes similar 
language in earlier or contemporaneous agreements. It may be particularly 
useful to examine prior decisions of international tribunals interpreting 
similar treaty language to determine a default rule, as sophisticated treaty 
parties may be presumed to be aware of such decisions and to take them into 
account when drafting treaty language.
16
  
This interpretive approach is consistent with the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), the ICSID Convention, and many 
investment treaties. Under Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, a treaty 
should be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of its terms in 
context and in light of the treaty‘s purpose. The Convention defines the 
 
 
 13. Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in International Arbitration 
Procedure, 30 TEX. INT‘L L.J. 89, 113 (1995) (quoting Dominique T. Hascher, Consolidation or 
Arbitration by American Courts: Fostering or Hampering International Commercial Arbitration?, 1 J. 
INT‘L ARB. 127, 134 (1984)). 
 14. Id. at 115. 
 15. Alan Scott Rau, Arbitral Jurisdiction and the Dimensions of „Consent‟, 24 J. INT‘L ARB. 199, 
221 (2008). 
 16. This presumption is problematic if one is looking at decisions rendered subsequent to the 
creation of the treaty. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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relevant context as including the text, preamble, and annexes to the treaty. In 
addition to the context, ―any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties‖ should be taken into account.17 ICSID 
Convention Article 42(1) provides that when the parties do not agree on the 
law to be applied, a tribunal shall apply, inter alia, ―such rules of international 
law as may be applicable.‖18 Many BITs also instruct arbitral tribunals to 
apply principles of international law. For example, Article 40(1) of the 
Canadian Model BIT provides, ―[a] Tribunal established under this Section 
shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and 
applicable rules of international law.‖19  
The vague language in all three of these instruments leaves arbitrators 
great discretion to choose which rules of international law to apply, including 
at minimum the sources of international law recognized by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) Statute: treaties, customary international law, and 
general principles of law. The tribunal in M.C.I. Power Group v. Ecuador 
listed the sources of law it would consider to determine its jurisdiction: the 
ICSID Convention, the relevant BIT, and applicable norms of general 
international law, which the tribunal listed as including the customary rules 
recognized in the International Law Commission‘s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (hereinafter ILC Draft Articles) and the Vienna Convention.
20
 
Finally, the tribunal stated it would ―refer to precedents that state the legal 
implications of binding norms of conventional and customary international 
law that are applicable only to the extent that and insofar as they specifically 
relate to the present case.‖21 The tribunal‘s qualified endorsement of 
international judicial and arbitral precedent reveals an attitude toward 
precedent similar to that expressed in the ICJ Statute. Article 38 of the 
Statute provides that the court shall apply judicial decisions only ―as a 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law,‖ and only subject to 
the principle that the court‘s decisions have no binding force outside the 
particular case.
22
  
Like the ICJ, investment tribunals must avoid treating previous judicial 
and arbitral decisions as binding precedent because each ICSID tribunal 
 
 
 17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 18. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 42(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
 19. Canada 2004 Model BIT, art. 40(1), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/investmenttreaties.htm. 
 20. M.C.I Power Group L.C. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, ¶¶ 42–43 (July 31, 
2007). 
 21. M.C.I Power Group L.C. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/6, Award, ¶ 44, (July 31, 
2007) (emphasis added). 
 22. ICJ Statute of the Court, arts. 38 & 59, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index 
.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0.  
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interprets one of thousands of different investment treaties. Nonetheless, it 
would be foolish to ignore prior published decisions interpreting identically 
worded provisions. Such decisions inform the language lawyers choose when 
drafting treaties and provide context that is helpful for determining 
reasonable understandings of treaty language. With temporal jurisdictional 
provisions, there is a strong foundation of decisions to draw from. Investment 
treaties use the same language to restrict jurisdiction ratione temporis that 
treaty drafters have used since at least the Permanent Court of International 
Justice was established in 1922. 
Even so, tribunals should interpret consent to jurisdiction particularly 
carefully to give effect to the parties‘ intentions. As the tribunal in Mondev v. 
United States explained, ―[i]n the end the question is what the relevant 
provisions mean, interpreted in accordance with the applicable rules of 
interpretation of treaties.‖23 ICSID tribunals have repeatedly found that 
consent to jurisdiction should be interpreted by neither the principle of 
restrictive interpretation nor the principle of effective interpretation, by which 
an arbitrator interprets a treaty so as to give effect to the object and purpose 
of the treaty.
24
 In Amco v. Indonesia, the tribunal rejected the argument that a 
state‘s consent to an arbitration convention should be construed restrictively 
because it limited the state‘s sovereignty.25 The tribunal explained,  
[L]ike any other conventions, a convention to arbitrate is not to be 
construed restrictively, nor, as a matter of fact, broadly or liberally. It 
is to be construed in a way which leads to find out and to respect the 
common will of the parties: such a method of interpretation is but the 
application of the fundamental principle pacta sunt servanda, a 
principle common, indeed, to all systems of international law and to 
international law. 
Moreover—and this is again a general principle of law—any 
convention, including conventions to arbitrate, should be construed in 
good faith, that is to say by taking into account the consequences of 
their commitments the parties may be considered as having reasonably 
and legitimately envisaged.
26
 
The tribunal in SPP v. Egypt similarly reasoned, ―jurisdictional instruments 
are to be interpreted neither restrictively nor expansively, but rather 
 
 
 23. Mondev v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award ¶ 43 (Oct. 11, 2002). 
 24. See, e.g., id. See generally CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, ICSID: A COMMENTARY 249 (2001). 
 25. Amco v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 13–
15 (Sept. 25, 1983) 1 ICSID REPORTS 389, 393–94 (1993).  
 26. Id. ¶ 14. 
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objectively and in good faith, and jurisdiction will be found to exist if—but 
only if—the force of the arguments militating in favor of it is 
preponderant.‖27 Objectivity and a good faith effort to determine the parties‘ 
intent are thus a tribunal‘s guiding principles for interpreting jurisdictional 
clauses. The remainder of this Article will examine investment tribunals‘ use 
of outside sources in light of these principles. 
III. JURISDICTION OVER ACTS OCCURRING BEFORE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF 
THE RELEVANT TREATY 
A. The Rule Against Retroactivity of Treaties  
The obvious starting point for interpreting ambiguous temporal 
restrictions in an investment treaty is Article 28 of the Vienna Convention, 
which provides: ―Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is 
otherwise established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act 
or fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the date 
of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.‖28 
Regarding this rule, the International Law Commission (ILC) has said,  
The reasons for its existence are obvious: first, since the main function 
of rules imposing obligations on subjects of law is to guide their 
conduct in one direction and divert it from another, this function can 
only be discharged if the obligations exist before the subjects prepare 
to act; secondly, and more important, the principle in question 
provides a safeguard for these subjects of law, since it enables them to 
establish in advance what their conduct should be if they wish to avoid 
a penal sanction or having to pay compensation for damage caused to 
others.
29
  
The two primary rationales of the rule against retroactivity, then, are that 
treaties are meant to guide future conduct and that states must be given notice 
before they are held accountable.  
The operative words from the Vienna Convention for the present 
discussion are, ―unless a different intention appears.‖30 States can agree to 
 
 
 27. SPP v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 63, (Apr. 14, 1988), 3 
ICSID REPORTS 131, 144. 
 28. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 28. 
 29. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session, 3 
May—23 July 1976, [1976] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 1, 90, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976/Add.1 
(Part 2). 
 30. Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 15. 
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grant or withhold jurisdiction over past actions, or over actions that began in 
the past and continue to the present. For example, they can preclude 
jurisdiction over disputes based on acts that began before but continue after a 
BIT enters into force.  
One important and difficult question arises when a treaty provision 
granting arbitral jurisdiction does not expressly limit jurisdiction ratione 
temporis. In such cases, what is the default rule? Applying the non-
retroactivity principle to jurisdictional consent is not straightforward. One 
must distinguish between the temporal scope of the treaty‘s substantive 
obligations and jurisdiction ratione temporis granted to an arbitral body 
constituted under the treaty. It is clear that—unless otherwise explicitly 
stated—conduct that begins and ends before a treaty entered into force 
cannot violate obligations created by the treaty. This result follows from the 
two bases for the non-retroactivity principle: obligations can only guide 
future conduct, and states must be given notice before they are held 
accountable.  
However, these rationales do not apply as cleanly to jurisdictional treaties. 
Rather than imposing a substantive obligation meant to guide states‘ future 
conduct, a purely jurisdictional treaty might do nothing more than establish a 
mechanism for adjudicating disputes. It is easy to see how such a treaty with 
no express temporal limitations could reasonably be read to apply to all 
disputes that exist after the dispute adjudication mechanism is created—even 
those that predate the treaty. The only obligation imposed is that states 
arbitrate their disputes—an obligation which does not implicate past conduct. 
There is no notice problem because, when they sign the treaty, states know 
that their existing disputes will be subject to it. 
Similarly, an agreement imposing substantive obligations may also create 
a dispute resolution mechanism that applies to any dispute between the 
parties, not just to disputes over the substantive obligations. In such cases, it 
is not clear that the default rule for arbitration provisions is that they apply 
only to disputes over future facts. If the dispute arose before the treaty and 
involved obligations that existed before the treaty entered into force, allowing 
a tribunal to hear the dispute is not a prima facie violation of the rule against 
retroactivity.  
Indeed, some authorities have argued that the default for jurisdictional 
clauses is that they apply to all disputes existing after their entry into force. 
For example, the Third Report on the Law of Treaties, a precursor to Article 
28 of the Vienna Convention, states the following: 
The word ―disputes‖ according to its natural meaning is apt to cover 
any dispute which exists between the parties after the coming into 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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force of the treaty. It matters not either that the dispute concerns 
events which took place prior to that date or that the dispute itself 
arose prior to it; for the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration or 
judicial settlement all their existing disputes without qualification.
31
 
Various international adjudicatory bodies have interpreted similar 
jurisdictional consent clauses divergently. The next section of this Article 
will describe four types of language used in jurisdictional provisions before 
turning to international jurisprudence to explore how this language has been 
interpreted. 
B. Unless a Different Intention Appears: Four Categories of Temporal 
Limitations in Consent Provisions 
I have identified four levels of temporal restriction on jurisdiction. When 
analyzing decisions on jurisdiction ratione temporis, keeping these levels in 
mind helps one to distinguish decisions interpreting different types of consent 
and faithfully extrapolate principles from these decisions. The way 
continuing circumstances affect jurisdiction depends on the temporal 
limitations in the relevant treaty.  
The first level of consent contains no explicit limitation ratione temporis. 
I will refer to this type of jurisdictional grant as unrestrictive consent. I do not 
mean that it is in fact unrestricted, but that there are no explicit temporal 
jurisdiction restrictions in the treaty. An example of this type of agreement is 
the United States-Ecuador BIT, which contains no express limitations on 
temporal jurisdiction in Article VI, where the arbitral consent clause is 
located.
32
 The only temporal clause in the treaty is in article XII, which states 
that the treaty ―shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into 
force as well as to investments made or acquired thereafter.‖33  
The second level of temporal limitation has been called single exclusion.
34
 
These consent clauses explicitly exclude jurisdiction over disputes arising 
before the entry into force of the treaty. An example is the Peru-Chile BIT, 
which specifies that ―[i]t shall not, however, apply to differences or disputes 
that arose prior to its entry into force.‖35 There are actually two variants of 
 
 
 31. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, [1964] 2 Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n 
5, 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/ADD.1. 
 32. See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador Concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. VI, Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. 
No. 103–15 [hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador BIT]. 
 33. Id. art. XII. 
 34. Industria Nacional, supra note 11, Decision on Annulment ¶ 94. 
 35. Peru-Chile BIT, supra note 10, art. 2. 
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single-exclusion clauses, but it is not necessary here to apply separate 
terminology to them. The clauses may exclude only ―disputes‖ that arose 
prior to entry into force or, as seen above in the Peru-Chile BIT, ―disputes‖ 
and ―differences‖ arising before entry into force. Some international tribunals 
have interpreted differences to have a lower threshold than disputes; thus 
single exclusion clauses that include differences may be broader.
36
 
The third level of restriction has been labeled a double exclusion clause.
37
 
A double exclusion clause states that the jurisdictional provision shall not 
apply to disputes over facts or situations that occurred prior to its entry into 
force. This language provides the broadest possible restriction because it can 
be interpreted to exclude even disputes that arise after the treaty entered into 
force, when the dispute involves actions or events that occurred prior to entry 
into force. An example appears in the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) case Phosphates of Morocco, in which the French Declaration 
accepting the court‘s jurisdiction submitted ―any disputes which may arise 
after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or 
facts subsequent to such ratification . . . .‖38 Though some have interpreted 
double exclusion clauses as strictly curbing temporal jurisdiction to post-
treaty acts, two minority opinions in Phosphates in Morocco took a different 
position.
39
 These dissents reasoned that jurisdiction over situations or facts 
subsequent to the Declaration includes not only situations or facts arising 
subsequent to the Declaration, but all situations or facts existing subsequent 
to it.
40
 An early report by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on State 
Responsibility shared this broader view of jurisdiction.
41
 
 
 
 36. See, e.g., Helnan Int‘l Hotels v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, 
Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 35–57 (Oct. 17, 2006). But see Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. v. 
Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4, Award, ¶¶ 38–62 (Feb. 7, 2005) (omitting to even 
mention the possibility of a difference between a ―difference‖ and a ―dispute‖ under the BIT and, 
accordingly, basing its determination of temporal jurisdiction entirely on when the dispute arose). 
 37. Industria Nacional, supra note 11, Decision on Annulment ¶ 94.  
 38. Phosphates in Morocco (It. v. Fr.), Preliminary Objections, 1938 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 74, at 
22 (June 14, 1938) (translating French Declaration of September 19, 1929) (original French: ―tous les 
différends qui s‘élèveraient après la ratification de la présente déclaration au sujet des situations ou des 
faits postérieurs à cette ratification‖). 
 39. It is difficult to discern whether the Phosphates in Morocco majority read the clause to mean 
―arising‖ or ―existing‖. The majority focused its discussion on determining the real cause of the 
dispute. It found that the real cause of the dispute was a ―fact‖—a particular legislative act—that was 
completed before the Declaration granting jurisdiction. The majority therefore did not reach whether a 
continuing fact or situation that arose before entry into force but continued after could give the PCIJ 
jurisdiction. See id. at 23. 
 40. See id. at 35 (Eysinga, J., dissenting); id. at 36–37 (Tien-Hsi, J., dissenting).  
 41. Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report on State Responsibility, ¶¶ 31–32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ 
307 (1978) (agreeing with the dissenting opinions in Phosphates in Morocco); see also John Fischer 
Williams, The Optional Clause, 11 BRIT. Y.B. INT‘L L. 63, 74 (1930) (recognizing the ambiguity in 
limiting jurisdiction to ―disputes arising . . . with regard to situations or facts subsequent to . . . 
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A final type of temporal exclusion, subject matter exclusion, occurs 
indirectly or implicitly. Subject matter exclusion exists when the treaty grants 
jurisdiction only over disputes arising from interpretation of the agreement. 
This type of limitation on an arbitral tribunal‘s jurisdiction ratione materiae 
implicitly limits the tribunal‘s jurisdiction ratione temporis because of the 
principle of non-retroactivity. An example of such a clause appears in 
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, a case before the PCIJ. Jurisdictional 
consent came from the Palestinian Mandate and stated: 
The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise 
between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations 
relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the 
Mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be 
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice . . . .42 
Another example is Article 1116 of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), which allows for claims of violations of specific 
NAFTA provisions:  
An investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under this Section a 
claim that another Party has breached an obligation under: 
 (a) Section A or Article 1503(2) (State Enterprises), or 
 (b) Article 1502(3)(a) (Monopolies and State Enterprises) . . . .
43
 
ICSID tribunals interpreting NAFTA have held that conduct that began 
before but continued after the treaty‘s entry into force could become subject 
to the treaty‘s substantive obligations and thus to the tribunal‘s jurisdiction 
under Article 1116.
44
 However, only the portion of the conduct occurring 
after entry into force is subject to the tribunal‘s jurisdiction.45 Similarly, in 
Mavrommatis, the PCIJ held that a subject matter exclusion allowed 
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the terms of the British Mandate, 
                                                                                                                         
 
ratification‖: ―If a state is in occupation of contested territory at the date of the ratification and 
continues in occupation afterwards, is this a situation ‗subsequent‘, as well as prior, to ratification?‖). 
 42. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Gr. v. U.K.), Judgment No. 2, 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 
No. 2, at 11 (Aug. 30) (emphasis added). 
 43. North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1116, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 132 I.L.M. 
289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 44. See Mondev, supra note 23, Award ¶ 58; Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mex. States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Interim Decision on Preliminary Jurisdictional Issues, ¶ 62 (Dec. 6, 
2000).  
 45. See id. 
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even if the dispute involved acts that occurred before entry into force.
46
 The 
PCIJ reasoned similarly to the Mondev tribunal: ―[The] breach, no matter on 
what date it was first committed, still subsists, and the provisions of the 
Mandate are therefore applicable to it.‖47 
The next section of this Article will examine the history of the concept of 
continuing circumstances and how it has been used to determine jurisdiction 
over acts occurring before a treaty‘s entry into force. 
C. The Origin of Continuing Circumstances Outside Human Rights 
Jurisprudence 
Though the concept of continuing circumstances has been used for 
jurisdictional purposes extensively, and most familiarly, in human rights 
cases, it did not originate in human rights law. In fact, several of the first 
cases addressing continuing circumstances arose in a commercial context in 
disputes similar to those heard by ICSID tribunals, involving claims against 
states on behalf of foreign investors. Each of these early continuing 
circumstances cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice and 
the ICJ involves a consent provision with a double exclusion clause. Central 
to all of the decisions is an emphasis on determining the real cause of the 
dispute.  
Preliminarily, before the PCIJ heard its first case involving continuing 
violations, it analyzed the effect of a subject matter exclusion clause on 
jurisdiction ratione temporis in 1924, in the case Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions.
48
 The court‘s analysis provides useful background to its later 
decisions. It highlights the importance of reading a jurisdictional provision 
carefully to ascertain whether it focuses on when a dispute arose or when the 
facts giving rise to the dispute occurred. The jurisdictional clause in the 
Palestinian Mandate provided that any dispute arising between the 
Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations regarding the 
interpretation or application of the Mandate must be submitted to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice.
49
 
 
 
 46. See Mavrommatis, supra note 42, Judgment No. 2 at 35. Several dissenting opinions argued 
that the court lacked jurisdiction because the dispute did not relate to the interpretation or application 
of the Mandate; however, they did not discuss non-retroactivity of substantive treaty obligation, 
focusing instead on the rationale that the subject matter of the dispute did not fit within any article of 
the Mandate. See id. at 38 (Dissenting Opinion of Lord Finlay); id. at 86 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
M. Oda); id. at 88 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge M. Pessôa). 
 47. See Mavrommatis, supra note 42, Judgment No. 2 at 35. 
 48. Id. at 35. 
 49. Id. at 11. 
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The case involved a dispute over concessions held by a Greek national in 
the Mandate. Greece alleged that the British authorities denied the investor 
the benefit of its concessions in violation of international agreements.
50
  
Britain challenged the court‘s jurisdiction ratione temporis on the grounds 
that the facts giving rise to the dispute arose before the Mandate entered into 
force.
51
 The court rejected this argument, holding that only the dispute must 
arise after the Mandate‘s entry into force for the court to have temporal 
jurisdiction. The court reasoned that ―in cases of doubt, jurisdiction based on 
an international agreement embraces all disputes referred to it after its 
establishment.‖52 It pointed to the language of the Mandate—―any dispute 
whatsoever . . . . which may arise‖—as supporting inclusive temporal 
jurisdiction.
53
 The court further supported the default rule it propounded by 
pointing to the many arbitration treaties with reservations excluding disputes 
arising from pre-existing events. It reasoned that these reservations 
―seem[ed] to prove the necessity for an explicit limitation of jurisdiction.‖54 
However, the court‘s analysis further considered the effect of the subject 
matter exclusion on temporal jurisdiction: ―If the Court‘s jurisdiction is based 
on Article II of the Mandate, this clause must be applicable to the dispute, not 
merely ratione materiae, but also ratione temporis.‖55 Thus, for a dispute to 
arise under the Mandate, it must arise after the Mandate‘s entry into force. 
Notice that what the court considered important was not when the facts or 
situations began, but when the dispute began. The court held that it is 
irrelevant that the concessions grant complained of was made before entry 
into force, because the concessions ―still subsist[], and the provisions of the 
Mandate are therefore applicable . . . .‖56 
In Phosphates in Morocco, the PCIJ first heard the argument that a 
continuing violation overcame the limitation ratione temporis in the 
instrument of jurisdictional consent.
57
 The court found that the real cause of 
the dispute before it was not a continuing act but a single, discrete act 
occurring before entry into force of the relevant jurisdictional agreement.
58
 
 
 
 50. Id. at 7–9. 
 51. Id. at 35. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Phosphates in Morocco, supra note 38, Preliminary Objections at 21–22.  
 58. Id. at 24–26 (―Situations or facts subsequent to the ratification could serve to found the 
Court‘s compulsory jurisdiction only if it was with regard to them that the dispute arose. . . . The 
situation which the Italian government denounces as unlawful is a legal position resulting from the 
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Therefore, it did not reach whether a continuing act could have overcome the 
explicit limitations of jurisdictional consent. Nonetheless, this decision 
introduced a line of inquiry central to continuing circumstances 
jurisprudence: the examination of whether or not a series of events in fact 
constitutes one continuing act, fact, or situation. 
The French Declaration accepting the court‘s jurisdiction contained a 
double exclusion clause, consenting to submit ―any disputes which may arise 
after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to situations or 
facts subsequent to such ratification . . . .‖59 The ―crucial date,‖ the date of 
ratification, was April 25, 1931.
60
  
The Italian government alleged that France and Morocco violated 
international obligations by monopolizing Moroccan phosphates.
61
 Italy 
presented the monopolization as a regime instituted by dahirs (orders) in the 
1920s, which reserved to the Maghzen the right to prospect for and work 
phosphates.
62
 Italy argued that this regime, still in operation, had established 
a monopoly at odds with Morocco‘s and France‘s international obligations.63 
Italy characterized the violations in two alternatives. The first alternative was 
as a whole group of measures contrary to the international obligations of 
France and Morocco, including the dahirs (orders) of 1920, expropriation of 
Italian nationals, and participation of the Moroccan Administration in the 
North-African phosphate cartel.
64
 The second, more limited, alternative was 
based on the January 8, 1925 decision of the Department of Mines rejecting 
the claim of an Italian investor. This alternative claim alleged denial of 
justice to him and his successors in interest.
65
  
Italy submitted that the double exclusion clause did not preclude its 
complaint even though some of the facts or situations giving rise to the 
dispute occurred before the crucial date. The court summarized Italy‘s 
arguments:  
[F]irst[,] because certain acts . . . were actually accomplished after the 
crucial date; secondly, because these acts, taken in conjunction with 
earlier acts to which they are closely linked, constitute as a whole a 
single, continuing and progressive illegal act which was not fully 
                                                                                                                         
 
legislation of 1920 . . . . [The] dahirs are ―facts‖ which, by reason of their date, fall outside the Court‘s 
jurisdiction.‖). 
 59. Id. at 22 (see supra note 38 for original French text).  
 60. Id. at 21. 
 61. Id. at 15. 
 62. Id. at 12–13. 
 63. Id. at 15. 
 64. Id. at 13–15. 
 65. Id. at 14–15. 
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accomplished until the crucial date; and lastly, because certain acts 
which were carried out prior to the crucial date, nevertheless gave rise 
to a permanent situation inconsistent with international law which has 
continued to exist after the said date.
66
 
Thus Italy invoked continuing circumstances to characterize the acts or the 
situation at issue as occurring later and therefore falling within jurisdiction.  
The court disagreed with Italy‘s claim that there was a single continuing 
act that gave rise to the dispute, holding instead that the dahirs alone created 
the situation. The ongoing situation was merely a ―legal position‖ that 
resulted from a prior discrete act that was the real cause of the dispute.
67
 
Because the dahirs occurred at a single point in time before the crucial date, 
the dispute was excluded from jurisdiction by the double exclusion clause.
68
 
The court thus did not discuss whether a continuing violation could 
overcome the double exclusion clause.  
Two of the dissents, however, did analyze how continuing acts would 
interact with the clause. They argued that the ―outer exclusion‖ meant simply 
that the fact or situation that is the basis of the dispute must continue to exist 
after ratification—that is, parties could not bring old claims for reparation. 
Both dissents argued that a reading that requires the facts or situations to 
arise after entry into force reads restrictions that do not appear into the text.
69
 
As the dissenting opinion by Jonkheer van Eysinga pointed out in a careful 
textual analysis of the consent provision, the language does not specify (in 
either the original French or the English translation) facts or situations 
arising after the date of ratification—it says facts or situations ―postérieurs à‖ 
or ―subsequent to‖ the date.70 Mr. Cheng Tien-Hsi‘s dissent pointed out the 
important purpose of the restriction to facts or situations subsequent—to 
exclude claims over completed wrongs. His view was that the denial of 
justice claim was rightly excluded because it was not a continuing situation 
or fact—―if . . . it was a wrong decision in 1925 . . . . it does no new mischief, 
infringes no new right, and therefore gives rise to no new fact or situation. 
Considered as a wrong, it is not an existing fact, but entirely a thing of the 
past.‖71 These dissents thus represent a relatively expansive view of 
jurisdiction under a double exclusion clause. 
 
 
 66. Id. at 23. 
 67. Id. at 25–26. 
 68. Id. at 26. 
 69. See id. at 35 (Dissenting Opinion by Jonkheer van Eysinga); id. at 36–37 (Dissenting 
Opinion of Mr. Cheng Tien-Hsi).  
 70. Id. at 35, at 327–28 (Dissenting Opinion by Jonkheer van Eysinga). 
 71. Id. at 36 (Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Cheng Tien-Hsi).  
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The PCIJ again addressed a continuing circumstances argument in 1939 
in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria.
72
 The case involved a dispute 
between Belgium and Bulgaria arising out of a concession owned by a 
Belgian company for power generation in Bulgaria. During World War I, the 
company was taken over by the Municipality of Sofia.
73
 The 1919 Treaty of 
Neuilly gave the Belgian company the right to restitution of its property and 
gave the Belgo-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (MAT) the task of 
adapting the concession contract to post-war economic conditions.
74
 In 1923 
and 1925 decisions, the MAT had instituted a formula for fixing the price per 
kilowatt-hour of power distributed.
75
 Subsequently, the Belgian declaration, 
on March 10, 1926, of reciprocal consent to PCIJ jurisdiction established the 
countries‘ mutual consent to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent 
Court. The Belgian Declaration contained a double exclusion clause identical 
to that in Phosphates in Morocco. The clause limited jurisdiction to ―any 
disputes arising after the ratification of the present declaration with regard to 
situations or facts subsequent to this ratification . . . .‖76  
Belgium brought the PCIJ suit, claiming that Bulgaria failed in its 
obligations by imposing ―a special artificially calculated tariff for coal 
supplied to power stations, in order to enable the Municipality of Sofia to 
distort the application of the [formula] given by the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal.‖77 Belgium also alleged that decisions of Bulgarian courts 
―deprived the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria of the benefit of the 
said decisions of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal . . . .‖78 The challenged court 
decisions allowed, inter alia, the use of a ―fictitious value‖ in the formula and 
the use of an ―official rate of exchange decreed by the National Bank of 
Bulgaria and not on the basis of the rate of exchange actually applied by that 
Bank . . . .‖79 Belgium also complained that changes in the Bulgarian tax on 
electricity distribution violated Bulgaria‘s obligations to Belgium. 
Drawing from the court‘s reasoning in Phosphates in Morocco, the 
Bulgarian government argued that the court lacked jurisdiction ratione 
temporis because the real cause of the dispute was a fact that began and 
ended before the agreements: ―[a]lthough the facts complained of by the 
 
 
 72. Electricity Co. of Sofia & Bulgaria (Bel. v. Bulg.), Judgment, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 77 
(Apr. 4). 
 73. Id. at 69. 
 74. Id. at 70. 
 75. Id. at 81. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 65. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 65–66. 
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Belgian Government . . . all date from a period subsequent to March 10th, 
1926, the situation with regard to which the dispute arose dates back to a 
period before that date.‖80 In contrast to Phosphates in Morocco, here the 
continuing circumstance argument was presented to overcome jurisdiction 
rather than in favor of jurisdiction. Bulgaria argued that the situation was 
created in 1923 and 1925 by the price formula instituted by the MAT, and 
that because Belgium‘s complaints arose from Bulgaria‘s application of that 
formula, the formula was the focus of the dispute. Therefore, the dispute fell 
outside the date of consent to jurisdiction.  
The court rejected this argument, first acknowledging that the awards of 
the MAT did establish a situation dating from before March 10, 1926, which 
still existed.
81
 It found, nonetheless, that the dispute did not arise from this 
situation or from the MAT‘s awards.82 Citing Phosphates in Morocco, the 
court stated: ―The only situations or facts which must be taken into account 
from the standpoint of the compulsory jurisdiction . . . are those which must 
be considered as being the source of the dispute. No such relation exists 
between the present dispute and the awards of the Mixed Arbitral 
Tribunal.‖83 The court distinguished the source of the rights at issue from the 
source of the dispute.
84
 It reasoned that the awards of the MAT were ―. . . the 
source of the rights claimed by the Belgian Company, but they did not give 
rise to the dispute, since the Parties agree as to their binding character and 
that their application gave rise to no difficulty until the acts complained of.‖85  
In a discussion evocative of the distinction between but-for and proximate 
cause, the court said, ―[I]t is true that a dispute may presuppose the existence 
of some prior situation or fact, but it does not follow that the dispute arises in 
regard to the situation or fact. A situation or fact in regard to which a dispute 
is said to have arisen must be the real cause of the dispute.‖86 The court 
found the source of the dispute to be the Bulgarian government‘s application 
of the formula after consent to jurisdiction, not the decisions of the MAT. It 
thus held that it had jurisdiction ratione temporis.
87
 It again did not reach the 
issue of whether continuing acts could overcome the double exclusion clause. 
It merely determined that in this case, the dispute arose from acts subsequent 
to consent.  
 
 
 80. Id. at 81. 
 81. Id. at 81–82. 
 82. Id. at 82. 
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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In Right of Passage Over Indian Territory, the ICJ held that it had 
temporal jurisdiction over a dispute between India and Portugal regarding a 
right of passage over Indian territory between Portuguese territories.
88
 India‘s 
Declaration of February 28, 1940 contained a double exclusion clause, 
accepting the jurisdiction of the court ―over all disputes arising after February 
5th, 1930 with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date.‖89 
The court‘s analysis of the real cause of the dispute draws from the PCIJ 
analysis in Phosphates in Morocco;
90
 however, whereas in Phosphates the 
PCIJ found the first-in-time act was the dispute‘s real cause, here the ICJ 
found that the dispute did not arise until the last-in-time act occurred.  
Portugal brought the claim to require India to protect Portugal‘s right of 
passage between two Portuguese territorial enclaves within India. In 1954, 
anti-Portuguese insurgents revolted against the Portuguese in these 
territories.
91
 The Indian government did nothing to prevent the insurrection 
or protect the Portuguese right of passage, enacted new rules making it more 
difficult for the Portuguese to travel between the two enclaves, and ceased 
issuing transit visas for travel between them.
92
  
India countered that the real cause of the dispute was not the 1954 actions, 
but Portugal‘s claim to have a right of passage, which existed before India 
accepted the court‘s jurisdiction.93 India essentially argued that the 1954 
events were simply part of a continuing situation that arose prior to the date 
of India‘s acceptance of jurisdiction: the ―situation . . . invoked by Portugal 
. . . was repeatedly the subject of difficulties prior to 5 February 1930 . . . .‖94 
Rejecting India‘s argument, the court reiterated that the facts to be 
considered were those that are the ―real cause‖ of the dispute95 and found that 
until 1954 there had been no controversy over the existence of a right of 
passage.
96
 Without rejecting that there was an ongoing situation, the court 
found that the dispute did not arise until the final part of the situation. It 
emphasized that the dispute arose from ―all of‖ the facts, including India‘s 
failure in 1954 to comply with the obligation of Portugal‘s right of passage.97 
It concluded that the facts giving rise to the dispute could only be said to 
 
 
 88. Right of Passage Over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 1960 I.C.J. 6, 33–36 (Apr. 
12). 
 89. Id. at 33. 
 90. Id. at 35. 
 91. See id. at 13. 
 92. See id.  
 93. See id. at 22. 
 94. See id. 
 95. Id. at 35. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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have existed as of the occurrence of the last-in-time fact.
98
 The holding that 
the first constituent fact is not a real cause of the dispute does not make Right 
of Passage inconsistent with Phosphates. The PCIJ in Phosphates rejected 
jurisdiction because it found that a pre-treaty act—the enactment of the 
dahirs—was the ―real cause‖ of the dispute;99 whereas in Right of Passage 
the court applied the same ―real cause‖ analysis but found the dispute (the 
―conflict of legal views‖)100 to have arisen only upon India‘s actions in 1954.  
As the jurisprudence of the PCIJ and the ICJ shows, the concept of 
continuing violations was well established before the rise of human rights 
law. The PCIJ and the ICJ decisions emphasize ascertaining the real cause of 
a dispute to determine temporal jurisdiction. This emphasis stems directly 
from the language of the jurisdictional consent clauses that the courts were 
interpreting. Under double exclusion clauses, the courts did not have 
jurisdiction over disputes over facts or situations before entry into force. 
Thus the cause of a dispute—the facts or situation giving rise to it—is 
essential to determining whether a tribunal has jurisdiction. 
D. Further Development of Continuing Circumstances Analysis: Human 
Rights Jurisprudence 
Though the idea of continuing violations was thoroughly established in 
international law before the rise of international human rights law, human 
rights juridical bodies, particularly the European Court of Human Rights, 
used the doctrine extensively, applying the idea to various contexts. It has 
been argued that the distinctive nature of human rights treaties justifies 
specialized treatment of jurisdiction ratione temporis over human rights 
treaty violations.
101
 Under this view, because human rights bodies deal with 
peremptory norms, they have greater leeway than investment tribunals to 
expand time limitations.
102
 Thus human rights bodies‘ jurisdictional analysis 
could not properly be applied to investment arbitration.
103
 The supervisory 
bodies for human rights treaties generally accept the view that these treaties 
are unique; however, it is not clear that tribunals have relied on this 
 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. Phosphates in Morocco, supra note 38, Preliminary Objections at 25–26. 
 100. Id. at 34. 
 101. See, e.g., Antoine Buyse, A Lifeline in Time-Non-retroactivity and Continuing Violations 
Under the ECHR, 75 NORDIC J. INT‘L L. 63, 71, 75 (2006); M. Craven, Legal Differentiation and the 
Concept of the Human Rights Treaty in International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 489, 491, 519 (2000).  
 102. Merrill & Ring, supra note 6, Opinion of W. Michael Reisman ¶ 46; Rocio I. Digon, 
Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis under NAFTA Article 1116(2), Paper 74, STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
PAPERS, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/student_papers/74. 
 103. See Merrill & Ring, Opinion of W. Michael Reisman, supra note 6, ¶¶ 45–52. 
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uniqueness when deciding to override states‘ jurisdictional consent.104 
Considering whether the uniqueness of human rights supports expansion of 
ratione temporis for human rights adjudicatory bodies, Antoine Buyse 
contends,  
That this may in theory be the case can be deduced from the ‗different 
intention‘[sic]-clause [of the Vienna Convention]. The International 
Law Commission (ILC) in its commentary emphasizes that the 
particular wording used in Article 28 was preferred over ―unless the 
treaty otherwise provides‖ in order to allow for ―cases where the very 
nature of the treaty rather than its specific provisions indicates that it is 
intended to have certain retroactive effects.‖105  
Other writers have concluded that human rights treaties are not so unique and 
are instead part of general international law.
106
 Further, similarities between 
human rights treaty obligations and investment treaty obligations are 
important to the discussion of whether investment tribunals should apply 
jurisdictional reasoning derived from human rights cases. The European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has decided at least one case, and has 
another case pending, that could just as well have been heard by an ICSID 
tribunal. In Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, the ECHR heard claims of 
several violations of the Convention: due process violations under Article 6, 
protection of property violations under Article 1 of Protocol 1, and 
discriminatory treatment under Article 14.
107
 The applicant was a public 
company that held 49% of the shares of Sovtransavto-Lougansk (S-L), a 
Ukrainian public company in the transport sector.
108
 Shareholders in S-L 
decided to convert the company to a private company, reducing the 
shareholding of Sovtransavto Holding (SH) dramatically and enabling other 
shareholders to assume control of the company‘s management and assets.109 
In SH‘s resulting claim before a local arbitration tribunal, the Ukranian 
President pressured the tribunal to ―defend the interests of Ukrainian 
 
 
 104. See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 523 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 526, Decision on the 
Merits, (1997) (―[m]indful of the Convention‘s special character as a human rights treaty‖); Human 
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification 
or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under 
Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, ¶¶ 17–18 (Nov. 4, 1994) (denying 
that human rights treaties are simply a ―web of inter-state exchanges of mutual obligations‖). 
 105. Buyse, supra note 101, at 66.  
 106. See, e.g., E.W. Vierdag, Some Remarks About the Special Features of Human Rights 
Treaties, 25 NETH. Y.B. INT‘L L. 119 (1994). 
 107. Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 133.  
 108. Id. ¶ 10. 
 109. Id. 
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nationals‖ in the dispute,110 and the subsequent, sparsely reasoned decisions 
of the tribunal bore the mark of political pressure.
111
 Consequently, SH filed 
a complaint with the ECHR.  
Yukos v. Russia is a pending case before the ECHR. The court has 
decided that a number of Yukos‘s claims are admissible112 and has held a 
hearing on the merits
113
 but has not yet issued a final decision. Yukos, a 
publicly traded company, alleges Russia committed a number of violations 
including expropriation, arbitrary treatment, and denial of justice, in 
contravention of Articles 6, 7, and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of 
Protocol 1.
114
 Yukos alleges that Russia instigated tax and criminal 
investigations for the purpose of destroying and eventually nationalizing 
Yukos. Russia allegedly imposed huge unjustified tax liabilities on Yukos, 
froze its assets, forced it to sell a crucial subsidiary for drastically less than its 
value, and forced Yukos into bankruptcy. Ultimately, a state-controlled oil 
company, Rosneft, bought the former Yukos‘s assets.115 Shareholders of 
Yukos have concurrently pursued parallel claims against Russia arising from 
the same facts before investment tribunals under the Energy Charter Treaty 
and two bilateral investment treaties to which Russia is a party.
116
 
These cases illustrate the similarities that may exist in the facts and rights 
involved in investment protection and human rights cases, thus weakening 
the argument that doctrines developed by human rights bodies should be 
strictly confined to human rights violations.
117
  
Moreover, property is at the heart of any international investment, and the 
right to property has been recognized as fundamental since at least the late 
 
 
 110. Marius Emberland, The European Convention on Human Rights as a Means for the 
Protection of Foreign Investment: A Look at Sovtransavto Holding v. Ukraine, in INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND ARBITRATION 107, 108–09 (Christian Tietje ed., 2008). 
 111. Id. at 109. 
 112. See Oao Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, ECHR Case No. 14902/04, Decision on 
Admissibility ¶¶ 448–99 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
 113. See European Court of Human Rights, Press Release, Chamber Hearing Oao Neftyanaya 
Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (Mar. 4, 2010). 
 114. See Yukos, ¶¶ 1, 433–38. 
 115. See Yukos, ¶¶ 1–236. 
 116. See RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration V 079/2005, Final Award 
(Sept. 12, 2010) (holding, under the UK-Russia BIT, that Russia expropriated shareholders‘ property); 
Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA227, Interim Award on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility (Nov. 30, 2009) (finding jurisdiction under the Energy Charter Treaty over Yukos 
shareholders‘ claims against Russia); Renta 4 S.V.S.A. v. Russian Federation, SCC Arbitration V 
024/2007, Award on Preliminary Objections, Mar. 29, 2009 (dismissing the claims of some 
shareholders and holding those of other shareholders admissible under the Spain-Russia BIT). 
 117. See generally Matthias Ruffert, The Protection of Foreign Direct Investment by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 43 GER. Y.B. INT‘L L. 116–48 (2000); MARIUS EMBERLAND, THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS OF COMPANIES: EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF ECHR PROTECTION (2006). 
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Eighteenth Century.
118
 Further, some of the principles governing treatment of 
foreign investors correspond closely with principles of international human 
rights, particularly economic and civil rights. One such principle is that of 
non-discrimination.
119
 Another is the requirement of fair and equitable 
treatment of foreign investors, which has been interpreted quite broadly and 
called a requirement of customary international law. The fair and equitable 
treatment requirement has apparently merged into the general principle of 
international human rights law that ―a ‗well-governed state‘ must . . . ensure 
the respect of basic human rights in its territory, including, under some 
conditions, private property rights.‖120 Similarly, the concept of denial of 
justice in international investment law has been described as entailing the 
obligation to make available to foreigners a fair and effective justice system, 
as required by customary international law. This formulation is strikingly 
similar to the right to a fair trial in Article 14 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.
121
  
Thus, given the parallels between many of the rights guaranteed in human 
rights treaties and the rights guaranteed foreign investors in investment 
treaties, it is not immediately clear that human rights jurisprudence should be 
off limits to investment arbitrators. Moreover, continuing circumstances 
reasoning did not originate in human rights jurisprudence; rather, the ECHR, 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), and United Nations 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) borrowed from earlier decisions from the 
PCIJ and the ICJ. This fact renders the arguments about specificity of human 
rights obligations largely moot in this context. Building on the early 
international cases discussed above, human rights jurisprudence offers 
reasoning that investment arbitrators can examine for issues such as what 
acts should be considered continuing and how the obligation at stake affects 
the continuing or completed character of an act. The rest of this section will 
discuss human rights tribunals‘ contribution to continuing circumstances 
jurisprudence. 
The jurisdiction of the ECHR, established in Article 32 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, is temporally limited by a subject matter 
exclusion, since the court has jurisdiction only over breaches of the 
 
 
 118. See Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Unification Rather than Fragmentation of International Law? The 
Case of International Investment Law and Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 45, 45 (P.M. Dupuy, F. Francioni & E.U. Petersmann eds., 
2009). 
 119. See id. at 50.  
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 51; see generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION, supra note 118. 
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Convention: ―The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters 
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the 
Protocols . . . which are referred to it . . . .‖122 The jurisdictions of the IACHR 
and of the HRC are similarly limited.
123
 Because these tribunals have 
jurisdiction only over acts that violate their governing conventions, their 
continuing circumstances analyses focus on when an act began and ended, 
and whether, as a result, the act became subject to the convention‘s 
substantive obligations. 
Article 14 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (ILC Draft Articles) covers continuing breaches and draws its 
principles heavily from human rights cases.
124
 Article 14(2) provides that the 
breach of an international obligation by an act having a continuing character 
extends over the entire period during which the act continues and remains not 
in conformity with the international obligation.
125
 However, it must first be 
determined whether an act has a continuing character: Article 14(1) states: 
―[t]he breach of an international obligation by an act of a State not having a 
continuing character occurs at the moment when the act is performed, even if 
its effects continue.‖126 In human rights jurisprudence, whether an obligation 
falls under Article 14(1) or Article 14(2) is a fact-specific determination.
127
  
The commentary to Article 14 reiterates the importance of distinguishing 
an act from its effects:  
An act does not have a continuing character merely because its effects 
or consequences extend in time. It must be the wrongful act as such 
which continues. In many cases of internationally wrongful acts, their 
consequences may be prolonged. The pain and suffering caused by 
earlier acts of torture or the economic effects of the expropriation of 
property continue even though the torture has ceased or title to the 
property has passed. Such consequences are the subject of the 
secondary obligations of reparation, including restitution, as required 
 
 
 122. European Convention on Human Rights art. 32, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222.  
 123. See First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 62, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 124. See ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art.14, cmt. 
1 n.236, reprinted in [2001] II Y.B. Int‘l L. Comm‘n, Part Two. 
 125. Id. art. 14. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
 127. See X & Y v. Portugal, App. Nos. 8560/79, 8613/79 16 Eur. Comm‘n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209 
(1979). 
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by Part Two of the articles. . . . They do not, however, entail that the 
breach itself is a continuing one.
128
  
This reasoning is consistent with the PCIJ and ICJ‘s early analysis of 
continuing violations and the real cause of a dispute; recall the distinction in 
Phosphates in Morocco that the ongoing situation complained of was merely 
a ―legal position‖ that resulted from a discrete act, which was the real cause 
of the dispute.
129
  
Other authorities argue that effects are part of the determination of 
whether an act is continuing. Pauwelyn argues that the ECHR does take 
effects into account, in contradiction to the approach set out in the Draft 
Articles:  
From the outset, one of the decisive elements in the Commission‘s 
decision on whether a continuing situation exists has been whether the 
position in which the victim is placed represents a continuing situation 
in violation of the Convention or, on the contrary, a violation of its 
rights and freedoms which clearly dates from the past (i.e. an 
instantaneous fact). In other words, the Commission focuses on the 
effects on the victim of the act . . ., taking into account all relevant 
circumstances of the case, rather than on the objective qualification of 
the act as such or the subjective intentions of its author . . . . In this 
sense all rights and freedoms protected by the Convention can be the 
object of a continuing violation.
130
  
ECHR cases explicitly distinguishing acts from effects when analyzing 
jurisdiction ratione temporis seem to call this analysis into question.
131
 
However, ECHR jurisprudence supports a refined version of Pauwelyn‘s 
proposition: human rights bodies look to effects on the victim if these effects 
themselves violate an obligation. 
James Crawford has pointed out that under the ILC Draft Articles ―both 
the primary obligation and the circumstances of the given case‖ determine 
whether a breach or wrongful act is continuing.
132
 A desire to depict an act as 
continuing may guide how a plaintiff or a tribunal characterizes the 
 
 
 128. ILC Draft Articles, supra note 124, art.14 cmt. 6. 
 129. Phosphates in Morocco, supra note 38, Preliminary Objections at 325. 
 130. Joost Pauwelyn, The Concept of a „Continuing Violation‟ of an International Obligation: 
Selected Problems, 66 BRITISH Y.B. INT‘L L. 415, 421 (1996). 
 131. See McDaid v. United Kingdom, App. 25681/94, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD197 (1996); Odabaşi 
v. Turkey, App. 50959/99 (2006). 
 132. James Crawford, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSSION‘S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 136 (2002). 
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obligation allegedly violated.
133
 According to the ILC Draft Articles, ―[i]f the 
obligation in question was only concerned to prevent the happening of the 
event in the first place (as distinct from its continuation), there will be no 
continuing wrongful act.‖134 Conversely, if the state is obligated to end or 
foreclose a potentially ongoing state of affairs, the violation will continue for 
as long as the state of affairs exists.  
The HRC has found Article 27 of the ICCPR to be an obligation with an 
ongoing character, which can give rise to a continuing violation. Article 27 
prohibits states from denying members of minority groups the right to enjoy 
their culture, speak their language, and practice their religion.
135
 In Lovelace 
v. Canada, the applicant was born a member of the Maliseet Indian tribe, but 
under the Indian Act, she lost legal status as a tribe member because she 
married a non-Indian.
136
 The Committee held that it did not have jurisdiction 
over the part of the claim pertaining to how the Indian Act operated at the 
time of her marriage to deprive her of her Indian status, because her marriage 
occurred before Canada adopted the ICCPR.
137
 It went on to say, however, 
that it ―recognize[d] . . . that the situation may be different if the alleged 
violations, although relating to events occurring before [the date the 
Covenant entered into force], continue, or have effects which themselves 
constitute violations, after that date.‖138 The notion of a continuing violation 
of Mrs. Lovelace‘s rights guided the Committee to focus its analysis on 
Article 27 of the ICCPR. Considering the various ICCPR provisions 
Lovelace claimed Canada had violated, the Committee found Article 27 was 
the most relevant:  
[Article 27] concerns the continuing effect of the Indian Act, in 
denying Sandra Lovelace legal status as an Indian, in particular 
because she cannot for this reason claim a legal right to reside where 
she wishes to, on the Tobique Reserve. This fact persists after the 
entry into force of the Covenant, and its effects have to be examined, 
without regard to their original cause.
139
 
The Committee reasoned that the right of Lovelace to ―access her native 
culture and language ‗in community with other members‘ of her group, has 
 
 
 133. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 124, art. 14 cmt. 11. 
 134. See id. art 14 cmt. 14 (dealing with failures to prevent as continuing breaches). 
 135. Human Rights Committee, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, ¶ 3.2 U.N. Doc. A/36/40; GAOR; 
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40 at 166 (1981). 
 136. Id. ¶ 1. 
 137. Id. ¶ 10. 
 138. Id. ¶ 11 (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. ¶ 13.1. 
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in fact been, and continues to be interfered with, because there is no place 
outside the Tobique Reserve where such a community exists.‖140 The 
Committee thus had jurisdiction over the Article 27 portion of the claim.
141
 
The decision of the IACHR in Velásquez-Rodríguez was the first to state 
that forced disappearance is a continuing violation,
142
 a position later codified 
in the U.N. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Forced 
Disappearance.
143
 In Velásquez-Rodríguez, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights did not draw conclusions affecting ratione temporis from its 
finding that the act was continuing, but this case laid the foundation for the 
court to do so later in Blake v. Guatemala.
144
  
Like Lovelace v. Canada, Blake focused on the effects of a completed act 
because those effects occurred within the court‘s temporal jurisdiction and 
independently violated an obligation. That obligation then became the basis 
for a claim, and the effect became the act or omission at issue. The court 
could not address Blake‘s kidnapping and murder because they were 
completed before Guatemala accepted the court‘s jurisdiction. However, the 
court reasoned,  
[A]lthough some of the acts had been completed, their effects could be 
deemed to be continuing until such time as the victims‘ fate or 
whereabouts were determined. Inasmuch as in this case Mr. Nicholas 
Blake‘s fate or whereabouts were not known until . . . after the date on 
which Guatemala accepted the contentious jurisdiction of this 
Tribunal, the Court considers itself competent to hear the case with 
regard to the possible violations which the Commission imputes to the 
State in connection with those effects and actions.
145
 
Though the court used the language of ―effects‖, it cited an ongoing pattern 
of behavior on the part of the state as the basis for the violations. This was 
not a case in which jurisdiction was based on lingering effects of a singular 
act.  
Similarly, in Solórzano v. Venezuela, the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
held that it did not have jurisdiction over the complained of arrest, search and 
seizure, and torture, because these acts occurred prior to the entry into force 
 
 
 140. Id. ¶ 15. 
 141. Id. ¶¶ 15–17. 
 142. See Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 
¶ 155 (July 29, 1988). 
 143. See U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappearance art. 17, 
G.A. Res. 47/133, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc A/47/49, at 207 (Dec. 18, 1992). 
 144. See Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 36 (1998). 
 145. Id. ¶ 54. 
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of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol, which permitted individuals to file 
complaints for violations of the ICCPR.
146
 However, the Committee did 
examine on the merits the complainant‘s continued detention and alleged ill 
treatment after the date of entry into force.
147
 
In their continuing circumstances analyses of acts beginning before a 
treaty‘s entry into force, human rights bodies have provided well-reasoned, 
persuasive analysis that is applicable to the issue as it arises in investment 
arbitration. Their contributions include the distinction between ―what 
constitutes an instantaneous breach with lasting negative effects on the one 
hand and a continuing violation on the other.‖148 Another related concept is 
how the nature of the relevant treaty obligation determines whether a breach 
is continuing. 
E. Continuing Circumstances and Pre-Treaty Acts and Disputes in 
Investment Arbitration 
International investment arbitral decisions have addressed how 
circumstances straddling a BIT‘s entry into force affect jurisdiction ratione 
temporis under three of the four types of jurisdictional consent provisions: 
unrestrictive clauses, single exclusion clauses, and subject matter exclusion 
clauses. This section of the Article will examine their treatment of each type 
in turn. 
1. Arbitral Decisions Based on Unrestrictive BITs 
Impregilo v. Pakistan was brought under the Pakistan-Italy BIT. The BIT 
contains an unrestrictive jurisdictional provision covering ―[a]ny disputes 
arising between a Contracting Party and the investors of the other.‖149 
Impregilo complained of a series of acts occurring both before and after the 
BIT, alleging these claims constitute a single continuing dispute, ―a 
systematic and continuous pattern of conduct that has resulted subsequent to 
 
 
 146. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976. 
 147. Human Rights Committee, Views of the Human Rights Committee under article 5, paragraph 
4, of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right, ¶ 5.5, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/27/D/156/1983 (Mar. 26, 1986). 
 148. See id. at 75. 
 149. Agreement Between the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the 
Government of the Italian Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments [hereinafter Italy-
Pakistan BIT] art. 9, ¶ 1, July 19, 1997. 
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the BIT‘s entry into force, in the current and continuing breach of the 
BIT.‖150 
The tribunal declared a default rule opposite of that in the PCIJ 
Mavrommatis case, where the jurisdictional provision similarly covered ―any 
dispute . . . which may arise.‖151 In Mavrommatis, the PCIJ presumed that if 
the treaty was silent about pre-existing disputes, ―jurisdiction based on an 
international agreement embraces all disputes referred to it after its 
establishment.‖152 In Impregilo, the tribunal concluded that because the BIT 
was silent, jurisdiction did not extend to disputes that arose before entry into 
force.
153
 Pointing specifically to the treaty language, ―any dispute arising 
between a contracting Party and the investors of the other,‖ the tribunal 
determined that ―such language—and the absence of specific provision for 
retroactivity—infers that‖ pre-existing disputes are excluded.154 Though the 
tribunal did not explain what about the language of this provision implies 
exclusion of pre-BIT disputes, the interpretation may have focused on the 
word ―arising.‖ The tribunal may have reasoned that since a pre-existing 
dispute does not ―arise‖ after entry into force, the parties must have meant to 
exclude such disputes from jurisdiction.  
Looking to the PCIJ and the ICJ, the tribunal found that a dispute is ―a 
disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests 
between the Parties.‖155 On the basis of this definition, it concluded that 
Impregilo‘s claims appeared on their face to fall within the tribunal‘s 
jurisdiction, since the dispute arose after entry into force.
156
 Up to this point, 
the tribunal had no cause to consider Impregilo‘s argument that Pakistan‘s 
alleged violations were continuing, since it was only concerned with when 
the dispute arose, not when the facts giving rise to the dispute arose. 
However, the tribunal further considered that all of Impregilo‘s claims 
were of BIT violations (even though the BIT did not limit jurisdiction to 
treaty claims).
157
 It thus engaged in an additional analysis ratione temporis as 
though the BIT contained a subject matter exclusion. On this basis, it 
reasoned that even though the dispute arose after entry into force, Pakistan 
could not be responsible for breaches of the substantive obligations of the 
 
 
 150. Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 297 (Dec. 22, 2003). 
 151. Mavrommatis, supra note 42, Judgment No. 2 at 35 . 
 152. Id. 
 153. Impregilo, supra note 150, Decision on Jurisdiction at ¶¶ 299–300. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. ¶ 302 (quoting Mavrommatis, supra note 42, Judgment No. 2 at 11 (the slight difference 
in wording is attributable to differences in translation from the French text)). 
 156. Id. ¶ 308. 
 157. Id. ¶ 309. 
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BIT occurring before it was in force.
158
 In this analysis the tribunal turned to 
and rejected Impregilo‘s claim that the acts were continuing and thus were 
brought under the treaty‘s substantive obligations once the treaty entered into 
force.
159
 Distinguishing between continuing acts and acts with continuing 
effects, the tribunal found that the pre-BIT acts complained of were not of a 
continuing character.
160
 The tribunal cited Article 14 of the Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility, but its analysis falls directly along the line of cases 
beginning with Phosphates in Morocco and continuing through ECHR cases 
distinguishing between acts and effects.
161
 
Chevron v. Ecuador
162
 was decided under the U.S.-Ecuador BIT, which is 
unrestrictive as to ratione temporis. Article VI of the BIT defines a relevant 
dispute as one ―arising out of or relating to‖ one of the enumerated types of 
investment transactions.
163
 The Chevron decision demonstrates a strong 
understanding of the subtleties of differing treaty language and its effect on 
ratione temporis. On the basis of the BIT‘s unrestrictive language and the 
tribunal‘s finding that an investment existed after the BIT‘s entry into force, 
the tribunal found it had temporal jurisdiction.
164
 However, because the 
parties argued extensively about jurisdiction ratione temporis over pre-
existing disputes, the tribunal addressed their arguments.
165
 
The claimants argued that absent restrictive language, the general rule is 
that a dispute resolution clause applies to all disputes that exist while the 
treaty is in force, regardless of when they first arose.
166
 The claimants cited 
Mavrommatis and a commentary to the Third Report on the law of treaties, a 
precursor to Article 28 of the Vienna Convention.
167
 There was authority 
that: 
[t]he word ―disputes‖ according to its natural meaning is apt to cover 
any dispute which exists between the parties after the coming into 
force of the treaty. It matters not either that the dispute concerns 
events which took place prior to that date or that the dispute itself 
arose prior to it; for the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration or 
 
 
 158. Id. ¶¶ 306–10.  
 159. Id. ¶¶ 311–14. 
 160. Id. ¶¶ 312–13. 
 161. See ILC Draft Articles, supra note 124, art. 14; McDaid v. United Kingdom, supra note 131; 
Odabaşi v. Turkey, supra note 131. 
 162. See Chevron v. Ecuador (U.S. v. Ecu.), Interim Award (Dec. 1, 2008).  
 163. U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 32, art. VI(1). 
 164. See Chevron v. Ecuador, supra note 162, Interim Award ¶¶ 43, 177–79, 187–90. 
 165. See id. 
 166. See id. ¶¶ 248–49. 
 167. See id. ¶¶ 249–50. 
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judicial settlement all of their existing disputes without 
qualification.
168
 
The claimants also cited Mavrommatis for the distinction between 
jurisdiction ratione temporis and the temporal application of the substantive 
provisions of a BIT.
169
 They distinguished Lucchetti v. Peru because the BIT 
in that case contains a single exclusion clause: ―[i]t shall not . . . apply to 
differences or disputes that arose prior to its entry into force.‖170 They 
distinguished Impregilo v. Pakistan as excluding only claims of substantive 
breaches based on conduct that occurred before entry into force.
171
  
Accepting the claimants‘ arguments, the tribunal returned to the original 
default rule in Mavrommatis, finding that although jurisdictional clauses do 
not have default retroactive application, the language of most disputes 
clauses constitutes consent to jurisdiction over all disputes existing after the 
entry into force, ―[b]y using the word disputes without any qualification.‖172 
That is the case with the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.
173
 The tribunal recognized that 
this was not an issue of retroactivity, but of applying the language of the 
consent provision of the BIT.
174
 Some other BITs specifically impose 
temporal limitations on disputes and not just investments.
175
 Though the 
tribunal did not distinguish Impregilo on the basis of different treaty 
language, it is possible to distinguish the language of the jurisdictional clause 
in that case. The BIT in Impregilo provided jurisdiction over ―[a]ny disputes 
arising between a Contracting Party and the investors of the other.‖176 Here, 
on the other hand, the language is ―arising out of or relating to‖ investments 
between the parties. A plausible reading is that the latter formulation is 
temporally broader and does not require the dispute to arise after the treaty‘s 
entry into force. 
In stark contrast to Chevron v. Ecuador, M.C.I. Power Group v. Ecuador 
is an example of how investment tribunals should not use prior adjudicative 
decisions. The tribunal egregiously misapplied rules from prior decisions 
with complete disregard for differences in treaty language. Despite the 
absence of any temporal restriction in the BIT, the tribunal found not only 
 
 
 168. See id. ¶¶ 248–49 (quoting Waldock, supra note 31, at 11). 
 169. See Chevron, supra note 164, Interim Award ¶ 250. 
 170. Id. ¶ 251 (quoting Lucchetti, supra note 36, Award ¶ 25). 
 171. Id. ¶ 253. 
 172. Id. ¶ 267. 
 173. See id. ¶ 177. 
 174. See id. ¶ 267 (quoting 11 THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949–1998 670 (Arthur 
Watts ed., 2000)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Italy-Pakistan BIT art. 9, ¶ 1, supra note 149 (emphasis added). 
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that it did not have jurisdiction over pre-BIT disputes, but also that there was 
no jurisdiction over disputes relating to pre-BIT acts.
177
 It thus created a 
default rule with the same effect as a double exclusion clause. Its reasoning is 
meandering and muddled. In declining to annul the award, the ad hoc 
Committee took great pains to emphasize its limited power to overturn 
awards.
178
 The Committee pointed out that the tribunal had complied with its 
own declaration early in the decision that it would look to ―‗applicable norms 
of international law.‘‖179 As the ad hoc Committee tellingly noted, ―[i]t is 
another matter—over which the ad hoc Committee has only a very limited 
competence–whether the Tribunal‘s application of the law was well-founded 
and legally tenable.‖180 
The tribunal first held that the intention of the parties regarding 
retrospective application is not evident from the language and background of 
the BIT.
181
 After quoting Article XII of the BIT, which states that the treaty 
―shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as 
to investments made or acquired thereafter,‖ the tribunal bafflingly 
concluded: ―[t]he non-retroactivity of the BIT excludes its application to 
disputes arising prior to its entry into force.‖182 The first flaw here is that 
nothing in article XII speaks to non-retroactivity—if anything, the article‘s 
inclusion of pre-existing investments may evidence an intent to apply the 
treaty retroactively. The tribunal next mentioned the ―principle of the non-
retroactivity of treaties,‖ apparently referring to Article 28 of the Vienna 
Convention.
183
 However, the tribunal blindly stated this rule without 
reference to the caveat, ―unless a different intention appears,‖ and without 
considering the nuances of how Article 28 applies to jurisdictional clauses.
184
 
Next, the tribunal stated two principles, taken respectively from double 
exclusion and subject matter exclusion analysis, without explaining where 
the principles come from or why they might be applicable:  
The Tribunal distinguishes acts and omissions prior to the entry into 
force of the BIT from acts and omissions subsequent to that date as 
violations of the BIT. The Tribunal holds that a dispute that arises that 
is subject to its Competence is necessarily related to the violation of a 
 
 
 177. M.C.I., supra note 21, Award, ¶¶ 59–61.  
 178. M.C.I., supra note 21, Decision on Annulment ¶¶ 49, 51. 
 179. Id. ¶ 41 (quoting M.C.I., supra note 177, Award ¶ 42). 
 180. Id. ¶ 41. 
 181. M.C.I., supra note 177, Award ¶ 61. 
 182. Id. ¶¶ 60–61 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. ¶ 61. 
 184. See id. ¶ 61; see also Vienna Convention, supra note 17, art. 28. 
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norm of the BIT by act or omission subsequent to its entry into 
force.
185
 
The principle stated in the first sentence of this quotation, distinction of pre-
treaty acts from post-treaty acts, originated in analysis of double exclusion 
clauses. The focus on when acts occurred is appropriate in that context 
because double exclusion clauses exclude jurisdiction over disputes relating 
to facts before entry into force.
186
 The jurisdictional clause in the U.S.-
Ecuador BIT contains no such limitation;
187
 thus this principle is inapposite. 
The second sentence in the quotation is appropriate for analyzing either 
jurisdiction under a BIT with a subject matter exclusion clause or claims of 
substantive BIT violations. The U.S.-Ecuador BIT contains no subject matter 
exclusion clause, and the tribunal does not limit this rule to BIT claims. 
The tribunal continued its flawed analysis by delving into continuing acts 
analysis without any reference to how this doctrine interacts with the 
jurisdictional provision in the U.S.-Ecuador BIT.
188
 The effect of a 
continuing acts argument on temporal jurisdiction depends on the 
jurisdictional limitations in the relevant treaty. For example, if a jurisdictional 
provision excludes jurisdiction over disputes arising from pre-treaty facts or 
situations, a continuing acts argument may be used to show there is no 
jurisdiction because a situation began before entry into force. If, on the other 
hand, a treaty—like the U.S.-Ecuador BIT—does not limit jurisdiction based 
on when the facts or situations giving rise to the dispute occurred, such a 
continuing acts argument is inapposite.  
2. Arbitral Decisions Based on Single Exclusion Clauses 
Where jurisdiction over a dispute arises under a BIT with a single 
exclusion clause, arbitral tribunals focus on when the dispute arose. For 
example, in Maffezini v. Spain, the tribunal considered a dispute under the 
Argentine-Spain BIT.
189
 The temporal limitation in the BIT contains a single 
exclusion clause excluding disputes arising before the BIT: ―this agreement 
shall not apply to disputes or claims originating before its entry into force.‖190 
 
 
 185. M.C.I., supra note 177, Award ¶ 62. 
 186. See supra Parts III.B & III.C. 
 187. See U.S.-Ecuador BIT, supra note 32, art. VI. 
 188. M.C.I., supra note 177, Award ¶¶ 82–97. 
 189. See Maffezini v. Kingdom of Sp., ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision on Objections to 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 1 (Jan. 25, 2000). 
 190. Acuerdo para la promocion y law proteccion reciproca de inversions entre la Republica 
Argentina y el Reino de España [Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments between 
the Republic of Argentina and the Kingdom of Spain] art. II.2, Oct. 3, 1991, available at http://www. 
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Because the temporal clause draws the line based on when the dispute or 
claim arose, rather than when the acts in question occurred, the tribunal‘s 
focus is on when the dispute began.
191
 The analysis is thus quite similar to 
that in Impregilo, where the court read into the BIT an exclusion of pre-BIT 
disputes. 
Like Impregilo, several tribunals use the PCIJ/ICJ definition of a dispute 
as a disagreement on a point of law or fact, which must relate to clearly 
identified issues between the parties and must not be merely academic; it 
must be able to be stated as a concrete claim.
192
 There is usually a sequence 
of events that leads to the crystallization of a dispute, and the tribunal must 
examine this sequence to determine when the dispute ―arose‖ for the purpose 
of determining jurisdiction under the BIT.
193
  
In the context of a single exclusion clause, alleged continuing situations 
are used to argue that a dispute began before the treaty‘s entry into force and 
should thus be excluded from jurisdiction. In Lucchetti v. Peru, an arbitration 
under the Chile-Peru BIT, Lucchetti claimed that there were two disputes, 
that the earlier one had been fully resolved before the BIT by judgments in 
Lucchetti‘s favor before Peruvian courts, and that a new dispute later arose 
after the BIT.
194
 Peru contended that there was one continuing dispute that 
began before entry into force, thus excluding it from jurisdiction.
195
  
Siding with Peru, the tribunal found there was one continuing dispute 
arising before entry into force; thus it did not have jurisdiction ratione 
temporis.
196
 To determine whether the disputes were distinct or continuing, 
the tribunal sought to ascertain the ―real cause‖ of each, drawing from the 
early reasoning of the PCIJ in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria.
197
 
Finding that the disputes arose from the same subject matter, the tribunal 
held ―the present dispute had crystallized‖ before the BIT entered into 
force.
198
 
                                                                                                                         
 
sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/ARG_Spain_s.pdf (―[E]l presente Acuerdo no se 
aplicará a las controversias o reclamaciones que se hubieran originado antes de su entrada en vigor.‖). 
 191. See Maffezini, supra note 189, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶¶ 93–94.  
 192. Id. ¶ 94; Lucchetti, supra note 36, Award ¶ 48; M.C.I., supra note 21, Award ¶ 63; Victor 
Pey Casado v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Award ¶¶ 442–44 (May 8, 2008). But see Lucchetti, 
Annulment ¶ 91 (―The concept of ‗dispute‘ can clearly be defined in different ways depending on the 
context.‖). 
 193. See Maffezini, supra note 189, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction ¶ 96 (quoted in 
Impregilo, supra note 150, Decision on Jurisdiction ¶ 304). 
 194. Lucchetti, supra note 36, Award ¶ 40. 
 195. Id. ¶ 41. 
 196. Id. ¶¶ 49, 62. 
 197. Id. ¶ 50 n.4 (citing Electricity Co. of Sofia & Bulgaria (Bel. v. Bulg.), Preliminary Objection, 
1939 P.C.I.J. 64, 82). 
 198. Id. ¶ 53. 
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Victor Pey Casado v. Chile involved a claim under the Chile-Spain BIT 
based on actions beginning with the 1973 Pinochet coup and spanning to the 
date of the ICSID claim.
199
 Article 2 of the BIT contains a single exclusion 
clause, stating the temporal limitation that the BIT does not apply to claims 
or controversies arising before its entry into force.
200
 Finding that the word 
controversias in the BIT corresponds to the English word disputes as used in 
Maffezini,
201
 the tribunal found that the dispute arose after the BIT, because 
only then did Pey Casado first present a claim for restitution in Chilean 
courts that was opposed by the Chilean government.
202
 The disputes were 
thus within jurisdiction ratione temporis.
203
  
However, because the BIT‘s substantive obligations could only apply to 
actions occurring after its entry into force, the tribunal then undertook a 
subject matter exclusion analysis.
204
 In this analysis it rejected the claimant‘s 
argument that Chile‘s actions at the time of the coup were the beginning of a 
continuing act ending after the treaty came into force.
205
 It denied the 
expropriation claim because the expropriation occurred before the BIT‘s 
entry into force.
206
 However, it held that Chile breached the fair and equitable 
treatment provisions of the BIT when, after entry into force, it compensated 
third parties for the expropriation of the newspaper instead of the 
claimants.
207
 
3. Arbitral Decisions Based on Subject Matter Exclusion Clauses 
Duke Energy v. Peru is a rightly decided arbitral decision that failed to 
explicitly ground its reasoning in the instrument of jurisdictional consent. 
Peru consented to arbitration through its investment protection legislation 
and a ―legal stability agreement‖ (LSA) between Duke Energy and Peru.208 
The LSA limited jurisdiction by subject matter: the parties agreed to submit 
―any dispute, controversy or claim between them, concerning the 
 
 
 199. See Pey Casado, supra note 192, Award ¶ 466. 
 200. Acuerdo entre la Republica de Chile y el Reino de España para la proteccion y foment 
reciprocos de inversions [Agreement Between the Republic of Chile and the Kingdom of Spain for the 
Protection and Promotion of Investments] art. 2(3), Apr. 27, 1994, available at http://www.sice.oas 
.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/CHI_Spain_s.pdf. 
 201. Pey Casado, supra note 192, Award ¶¶ 442–43.  
 202. See id. ¶¶ 444–46.  
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Id. ¶ 466. 
 207. Id. ¶¶ 459–64. 
 208. See Duke Energy Int‘l Peru Invs. No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/ 
28, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 25–27 (Feb. 1, 2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
456 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:419 
 
 
 
 
interpretation, performance or validity of this Agreement‖ to ICSID.209 The 
tribunal rightly understood that the issue it had to determine was the time the 
dispute arose, and rightly held that it had temporal jurisdiction.
210
 However, 
it is troubling that the tribunal did not explicitly point out that it reached this 
conclusion based on the language of the agreement. By citing to Maffezini v. 
Spain with no discussion of whether the respective jurisdictional consent 
clauses in the two cases were parallel,
211
 the tribunal offered weak reasoning 
and risked misleading readers and future arbitrators to believe that the focus 
on when the dispute arose is a default rule in jurisdictional consent. 
Feldman v. Mexico involved a claim under NAFTA.
212
 Unlike many 
BITs, NAFTA‘s arbitral clauses in Articles 1116 and 1117 provide arbitral 
jurisdiction only over claims of NAFTA violations.
213
 Claimed violations of 
customary law or breach of contract are excluded by the provisions‘ language 
defining what claims may be brought;
214
 thus jurisdiction is limited to alleged 
violations occurring after NAFTA‘s entry into force, creating a subject 
matter exclusion. In a preliminary decision on jurisdiction, the tribunal held 
that because NAFTA came into force on January 1, 1994, no NAFTA 
obligations existed, and the tribunal‘s jurisdiction did not extend, before that 
date.
215
 This holding comports with the principle of non-retroactivity of 
treaties, which uncontroversially applies to all substantive treaty provisions 
where—as in NAFTA—the treaty contains no explicit statement to the 
contrary.
216
  
The tribunal‘s holding concerning continuing violations is also supported 
by NAFTA‘s jurisdictional language. If a continuing course of action began 
before NAFTA‘s entry into force and continued after that date, only the part 
of the alleged activity post-NAFTA is subject to the tribunal‘s jurisdiction, 
and only if it breaches a substantive NAFTA obligation. This holding is 
consistent with the holding of the PCIJ in Mavrommatis, where there was a 
similar jurisdictional limitation.
217
 
Mondev v. United States demonstrates good use of reasoning borrowed 
from human rights cases. Mondev brought NAFTA claims alleging 
expropriation, denial of justice, denial of minimum standard of treatment, 
 
 
 209. Id. ¶ 75. 
 210. Id. ¶¶ 148–51. 
 211. Id. ¶ 148.  
 212. Feldman, supra note 44, ¶ 1.  
 213. NAFTA, supra note 43, arts. 1116–17.  
 214. See id. 
 215. Feldman, supra note 44, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 61–63. 
 216. Id. ¶ 62. 
 217. See Mavrommatis, supra note 42, Judgment No. 2 at 35.  
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and denial of national treatment.
218
 All of the acts alleged to constitute 
violations occurred prior to NAFTA‘s entry into force, except decisions of 
Massachusetts courts rejecting Mondev‘s claims.219 Reminiscent of Italy‘s 
claim in Phosphates in Morocco, Mondev argued that all the actions 
constituted a continuing breach that was ―perfected‖ under the final court 
decisions.
220
 The pre-NAFTA acts allegedly created a continuing situation 
with an obligation to remedy, which, after NAFTA, the United States failed 
to remedy, breaching the treaty.
221
  
The tribunal held that pre-NAFTA conduct could not constitute a breach 
of NAFTA, but that it might be relevant to whether post-NAFTA conduct 
constituted a breach.
222
 The post-NAFTA conduct—in this case, the 
Massachusetts court decisions—must itself violate NAFTA for there to be 
such a breach.
223
 Recalling the principle of non-retroactivity, the tribunal 
stated that in certain circumstances conduct committed before the entry into 
force of a treaty might continue after that date, and at that point the conduct 
could become subject to treaty obligations and thus give rise to a claim under 
the treaty.
224
 The tribunal also distinguished between continuing acts and 
completed acts with continuing effects, citing the ILC Draft Articles, which 
in turn cite the early PCIJ cases and ECHR cases dealing with continuing 
acts.
225
 Drawing from this dichotomy, the tribunal reasoned that whether a 
breach is continuing depends on the nature of the obligation said to have 
been breached and the facts.
226
 Characterizing the claim in three alternative 
ways, the tribunal proceeded to analyze whether under each characterization, 
the series of acts could have been said to have continued after NAFTA, and 
concluded they could not.
227
 In each characterization, the tribunal found that 
there was a date before entry into force that the alleged conduct was 
completed.
228
  
 
 
 218. Mondev, supra note 23, Award ¶ 2. 
 219. See id. ¶¶ 47–67. 
 220. Id. ¶ 48. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. ¶ 68–69. 
 223. Id. ¶ 70. 
 224. Id. ¶¶ 57–58 n.9. 
 225. Id. ¶ 58 n.9; ILC Draft Articles, supra note 124, art. 14 n.236 (citing Mavrommatis, supra 
note 42, Judgment at 35, Phosphates in Morocco, supra note 38, Preliminary Objections at 33–39; 
Electricity Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, supra note 72, Judgment at 80–82; Right of Passage Over Indian 
Territory, supra note 88, Judgment at 33–36; De Becker v. Belgium, App. No. 214/56, 1958–59 Y.B. 
Eur. Conv. on H.R. 214, 234, 244 (Eur. Comm‘n on H.R.); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. B) at 64 (1978)).  
 226. Id. ¶ 58. 
 227. Id. ¶¶ 59–65. 
 228. See id.  
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Finally, the tribunal held that Articles 1105 (minimum standard of 
treatment) and 1110 (expropriation and compensation) cannot resurrect 
remedial claims for breaches of customary international law occurring before 
NAFTA where the breaches were based on conduct that ended before 
NAFTA‘s entry into force.229 The tribunal concluded that the only possible 
bases of a claim—the only acts that could have breached NAFTA—were the 
U.S. court decisions handed down after NAFTA dismissing Mondev‘s 
claims.
230
 
F. Should Arbitral Tribunals Borrow Continuing Circumstances Analysis 
When Deciding on Jurisdiction Over Pre-BIT Circumstances? 
Continuing circumstances analysis in this context grew out of early 
interstate disputes, where the jurisprudence contributed the practice of 
scrutinizing the facts to determine a dispute‘s real cause. Human rights 
jurisprudence further developed the idea of continuing acts in this context, 
contributing two useful lines of reasoning: expanded analysis of the 
distinction between acts and effects, and a focus on the nature of the 
obligation to determine whether a violation is continuing. It is not evident 
that this analysis should never be extended to other areas of international law, 
including investment law. Human rights jurisprudence draws from the early 
analysis of the PCIJ and ICJ distinguishing a past fact from its ongoing 
effects. The body of human rights law addressing this issue does not rely on 
foundations specific to human rights or on peremptory norms of international 
law to justify continuing acts analysis, but focuses instead on the character of 
particular acts and obligations and how they relate to one another. 
Arbitral tribunals may appropriately use continuing circumstances 
analysis drawn from international law sources outside investment law. 
However, they must apply the doctrine carefully, in keeping with the 
jurisdictional consent clauses in the governing BIT. When looking at 
international ―precedent‖, arbitral tribunals must be mindful of the language 
of the treaty the prior decision was interpreting, and of how the relevant BIT 
might differ. Among investment treaties, NAFTA‘s jurisdictional limitation 
is the most similar to the limitations in the PCIJ, ICJ, and human rights cases. 
This is because NAFTA contains a subject matter exclusion, which 
effectively limits jurisdiction to conduct occurring after entry into force, with 
the possibility that conduct continuing after entry into force could become 
 
 
 229. Id. ¶ 74. 
 230. Id. ¶ 75. 
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subject to jurisdiction.
231
 Because of the fundamentally different language in 
unrestrictive and single exclusion BITs, tribunals interpreting them must be 
more cautious when extracting principles from these earlier decisions. 
IV. EXPANSION OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION THROUGH CONTINUING 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
A. The Doctrine of Extinctive Prescription and Periods of Limitation 
Extinctive prescription, or laches, is the extinction of a title or right due to 
failure to exercise it over a long time period. Bin Cheng identifies a 
definition of the doctrine from 1903: ―When a right of action becomes 
extinguished because the person entitled thereto neglects to exercise it after a 
period of time, this extinction of the right is called prescriptive of action.‖232 
There is no particular time limit recognized by the general principle in 
international law.
233
 However, the doctrine is the basis for statutes of 
limitations in domestic legal systems and is so ubiquitous that it is considered 
a general principle of law.
234
 Like statutes of limitations, clauses setting 
specific periods of limitation for bringing a claim appear in many investment 
treaties. For example, Article 22(2) of the 2004 Canada Model BIT states: 
―An investor of a Party may not make a claim if more than three years have 
elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have 
first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the 
investor has incurred loss or damage.‖235  
Graeme Mew elaborates four categories of reasons for a limitations 
system: ―peace and repose‖, evidentiary concerns, economic and public 
interest considerations, and judgmental reasons.
236
 The English Law 
Commission has explained the rationale of predictability: 
[T]he public have a great interest, in having a known limit fixed by 
law to litigation, for the quiet of the community, and that there may be 
a certain fixed period, after which the possessor may know that his 
title and right cannot be called into question. . . . [T]he state has an 
interest in promoting legal certainty. Not only potential defendants, 
but third parties need to have confidence that rights are not going to 
 
 
 231. NAFTA, supra note 43, arts. 1116–17.  
 232. BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 373 (1953). 
 233. Id. at 373; GALLUS, supra note 3, at 94–95. 
 234. Id. at 93. 
 235. Canada 2004 Model BIT art 22(2), supra note 19. 
 236. Graeme Mew, THE LAW OF LIMITATIONS 12 (2d ed. 2004). 
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[be] disturbed by a long-forgotten claim. Financial institutions giving 
credit to businesses, for example, have an interest in knowing that a 
borrower‘s affairs will not be damaged by the revival of years old 
litigation. Buyers who want to purchase land or goods held by a 
potential seller want to know that their title cannot be disturbed by a 
third party to the deal.
237
 
Limitation periods also address the concern that loss of evidence may place 
the defendant in a difficult position. The rule presumes negligence by the 
claimant. Where he has allowed his claim to sit for so long that it becomes 
difficult to establish facts, they are resolved against him.
238
  
The next section of this Article will discuss derogation from prescriptive 
extinction in international law in light of the doctrine‘s purposes. 
B. The History of Derogations from Extinctive Prescription and Periods 
of Limitation 
Most scholars and students of international law are most familiar with the 
use of continuing circumstances to overcome periods of limitation in human 
rights jurisprudence, particularly in the context of forced disappearances.
239
 
However, the idea of derogating from extinctive prescription predates 
international human rights law,
240
 indicating that there are reasons to 
derogate besides the unique nature of human rights.  
First, the principle has been recognized that a period of limitation does 
not begin to run until a breach has ended. Pauwelyn states that ―[t]he general 
principle is that a claim can only be inadmissible on the ground of lapse of 
time once the breach has ceased to exist, that being the earliest date from 
which any time limit can possibly start to run . . . .‖241 This principle is 
recognized by the International Law Commission;
242
 many national legal 
systems, including Australia, Belgium, England, Japan, and the United 
States; and European law.
243
  
 
 
 237. ENGLAND AND WALES LAW COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER ON LIMITATION OF 
ACTIONS, ¶¶ 1.30–31 (1998) (quoting Cholmondeley v. Clinton, (1820) 27 Eng. Rep. 1036).  
 238. Cheng, supra note 232, at 378–79. 
 239. See, e.g., Blake v. Guatemala Inter-Am. C.H.R., Judgment (Jan. 24, 1998).  
 240. See King, supra note 1, at 88; Frans Viljoen, International Human Rights Law: A Short 
History, U.N. CHRONICLE, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/cache/bypass/home/archive/ 
Issues2009/internationalhumanrightslawashorthistory?ctnscroll_articleContainerList=1_0&ctnlistpagi
nation_articleContainerList=true (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). 
 241. Joost Pauwelyn, supra note 130, at 431. 
 242. Rep. of the Int‘l L. Comm‘n, 30th Sess., May 8–July 28, 1978, 88 n.425, 91 n.427, U.N. Doc. 
A/33/10; GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1978). 
 243. See GALLUS, supra note 3, at 104. 
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Second, international tribunals have long recognized that the customary 
international law principle time-barring the delayed presentation of a claim 
may be derogated from in certain circumstances, most importantly where the 
plaintiff has good reason for the delay—that is, where he was not negligent in 
presenting his claim.
244
  
An early case declining to apply laches appeared before the Italian-
Venezuelan Claims Commission in 1903.
245
 In the Tagliaferro Case, the 
claimant had been wrongly imprisoned by Venezuelan authorities and 
brought his claim over thirty years later.
246
 Finding the claimant had good 
reason for the delay, the commission held: ―When the reason for the rule of 
prescription ceases, the rule ceases, and such is the case now.‖247 The 
claimant had first petitioned the Venezuelan courts and then Italian diplomats 
in Venezuela immediately after his arrest, but his requests for protection were 
denied.
248
 The commission thus found Venezuela liable for the wrongful 
imprisonment and for denial of justice.
249
  
Similarly, in the Stevenson Case, the Mixed Claims Commission for 
Great Britain-Venezuela held that a forty-year-old claim was not barred 
because the delay was the fault of the respondent state rather than the 
claimant or the claimant state.
250
 The claim had previously been presented 
decades earlier. Venezuela responded that it could not hear claims because of 
its civil war and classified the claim as ―unrecognizable.‖251 The Commission 
reasoned, 
When a claim is internationally presented for the first time after a long 
lapse of time, there arise both a presumption and a fact. The 
presumption, more or less strong according to the attending 
circumstances, is that there is some lack of honesty in the claim, either 
that there was never a basis for it or that it has been paid. The fact is 
that by the delay in making the claim the opposing party—in this case 
the Government—is prevented from accumulating the evidence on its 
part which would oppose the claim . . . . In such a case the delay of the 
 
 
 244. See Case of Ann Eulogia Garcia Cadiz (U.S.-Venezuela Comm‘n 1890), in 4 JOHN BASSETT 
MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE U.S. HAS BEEN A PARTY 4199, 
4203 (1898); King, supra note 1, at 88–89 (―That failure to press, for good reasons (i.e., without 
negligence), is no bar has been held by Plumley, Umpire, in the Stevenson case, and by Sir Edward 
Thornton in the ‗Canada.‘‖). 
 245. Tagliaferro Case, 10 R.I.A.A. 592 (It.-Venez. Cl. Comm‘n 1903). 
 246. Id. at 593. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Stevenson Case, 9 R.I.A.A. 385 (Mixed Cl. Comm‘n Gr. Brit.-Venez. 1903).  
 251. Id. at 385–86. 
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claimant . . . would work injustice . . . to the respondent Government. 
This case presents neither of these features.
252
  
The Commission went on to explain that the claim had first been presented 
within a reasonable time period, so Venezuela knew of its existence and had 
the opportunity to collect and preserve evidence.
253
 The Commission 
concluded that it would be unjust to use laches to block the claim when the 
delay was the fault of Venezuela.
254
 
In the 1926 arbitration case Cayuga Indians (Great Britain) v. United 
States, the arbitral tribunal held that the claim of the Indian tribe for a 
situation that had existed for eighty years was not time-barred.
255
 As in 
Tagliaferro and Stevenson, the reason for the derogation from laches was that 
the complainant was not responsible for the delay.
256
 The tribe had no 
international legal status and was dependent on the guardianship of, 
respectively, Great Britain and Canada, to press its claim in an international 
forum.
257
 Though Great Britain had been negligent in pressing the claim, its 
negligence could not be imputed to the Cayuga Indian Tribe, which had 
pressed its claim ―continuously and persistently since 1816.‖258 The tribunal 
based its holding on: 
[T]he general principles of justice on which it is held in the civil law 
that prescription does not run against those who are unable to act, on 
which in English-speaking countries persons under disability are 
excepted from the operation of statutes of limitation, and on which 
English and American Courts of Equity refuse to impute laches to 
persons under disability. . .
259
 
An additional consideration was that New York had not been prejudiced by 
the delay, because the case had been brought to the legislature‘s attention and 
a public commission had recommended the state settle the claim.
260
 These 
cases show that derogation from extinctive prescription did not originate in 
human rights jurisprudence. There is longstanding authority for the principle 
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that a claimant should not be time-barred from presenting a claim where he is 
not responsible for the delay.
261
 
C. Derogation from the Period of Limitation in Human Rights Law 
The ECHR and the IACHR have used continuing violations to find that 
claims were not barred by periods of limitation. The body of human rights 
law applying continuing violations to overcome periods of limitation is less 
extensive than that applying continuing violations analysis to acts that began 
before a treaty‘s entry into force. The reasoning in the former set of cases 
does not draw on previous international adjudication, either explicitly or 
apparently. Neither do the human rights courts refer to the traditional 
rationales for a period of limitation or justify why they derogate from them. 
These characteristics of the human rights jurisprudence on this issue make it 
poor material on which to rely when interpreting investment treaties.  
In Jėčius v. Lithuania, the ECHR held that illegal detention was a 
continuing act that overcame the rule that a claim must be brought within six 
months of the violation.
262
 Lithuania objected to the application on the 
grounds that although the applicant remained in detention through the time 
he filed his claim in December 1996, the original ―preventive detention‖ on 
which the claim was based had ended more than six months before.
263
 The 
authorities had changed the basis for his detention from ―preventive 
detention‖ to ―detention on remand‖. The court rejected the objection 
because ―there had been no visible signs of a change of the applicant‘s status 
when his preventive detention had been replaced with detention on 
remand.‖264  
The court explained that ―[i]n respect of a complaint about the absence of 
a remedy for a continuing situation, such as a period of detention, the six-
month time-limit . . . starts running from the end of that situation—for 
example, when an applicant is released from custody . . . .‖265 In Jėčius, the 
court propounded the rule as generally applicable but did not offer an 
analysis of why the statute of limitations should not have begun to run 
earlier. It is puzzling that the court did not distinguish between the alleged 
violations that were apparent prior to the six-month period and those that 
 
 
 261. See also Ambatielos Claim (Gr. v. U.K.), 12 R.I.A.A. 83 (1956) (allowing delayed claim 
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 263. Id. 
 264. Id. ¶ 43. 
 265. Id. ¶ 44. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
464 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 10:419 
 
 
 
 
arose later. For example, Article 5 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights protects against deprivation of liberty without due process,
266
 so the 
violation of this right should have been apparent shortly upon his arrest. In 
contrast, the alleged violation on the grounds of excessive length of detention 
of sixteen months and one day could not have been brought within six 
months of the applicant‘s arrest; therefore, postponing the tolling of the six-
month rule for this violation was appropriate. The court did not explicitly 
reason that the applicant‘s persistence in pressing his claim affected its 
decision, but the opinion‘s facts section lays out his early and frequent 
objections presented to domestic authorities up to the time he filed an 
application with the ECHR.
267
  
In Cyprus v. Turkey, the court again stated the rule that for the purpose of 
the six-month rule, time begins to run when an ongoing situation ends.
268
 
Here the court took a more nuanced approach, distinguishing between 
situations that ended before the six-month period and those that continued.
269
 
The acts that were held to be continuing and thus allowed under the six-
month rule include the following: Turkey‘s failure to investigate the 
whereabouts of disappeared persons,
270
 to provide their relatives any 
information about the same,
271
 refusal to allow displaced persons to return to 
their homes,
272
 and de facto expropriation of property.
273
 
It remains puzzling that the court did not offer a rationale for allowing 
claims where the applicant knew or should have known of the violations 
more than six months before—that is, that the court distinguished claims 
based on when the violation ended rather than whether it by its nature 
required an extended time period to ripen. There are several possible 
explanations. The court may have reasoned that a strict application of the six-
month rule would eviscerate the Convention‘s protections by allowing states 
to continue violating rights with impunity. Additionally, because the statute 
of limitations here is extremely short, several of the jurisprudential 
considerations on which laches is based are implicated only weakly, if at all. 
The risk of loss of evidence after six months‘ passage of time is low; the risk 
probably remains low for years. The requirement that the violation be 
 
 
 266. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 5 
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ongoing decreases the likelihood that relevant evidence will be lost. It is also 
unlikely that parties‘ rights will be harmed because they relied on the 
foreclosure of litigation after a six-month period of limitation; however, the 
longer the violation continues, the more likely this concern will become 
substantial.  
Because the human rights bodies and courts are not clear about their 
reasons for using continuing acts analysis to overcome the period of 
limitation, their decisions do not offer persuasive analysis that can be applied 
to investment disputes. Investment arbitral tribunals should not adopt rules 
propounded by human rights bodies (or any other international bodies for 
that matter) without an understanding of the basis for the rules. With respect 
to this particular issue, the basis of the rules is unclear; thus, the rules should 
not be adopted.  
This does not mean, however, that a tribunal should never derogate from 
a period of limitation or that continuing acts analysis has no place in 
decisions on periods of limitation in investment law. Tagliaferro, Stevenson, 
and Cayuga Indians demonstrate international legal recognition that 
enforcing a period of limitation may not be appropriate where the delay in 
presenting the claim is not the fault of the claimant. 
D. Continuing Violations and the Period of Limitation in Investment 
Arbitration 
Allegations of continuing violations raised before ICSID tribunals to 
overcome periods of limitation have had mixed success. Several ICSID cases 
under NAFTA have involved arguments about whether the conduct in 
question occurred within NAFTA‘s three-year period of limitation. Articles 
1116 and 1117 of NAFTA impose a strict limitation period, stating that an 
investor cannot bring a claim on its own behalf or on behalf of an enterprise 
if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor 
first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach 
and knowledge that the investor or the enterprise has incurred loss or 
damage. Thus there are three points in time a tribunal must pinpoint to 
determine whether a claim has been brought within the period of limitation. 
First, the tribunal must determine the date on which the investor first 
acquired knowledge of the alleged breach. Second, even if the date of actual 
knowledge is found to be within the period, the tribunal must determine 
whether there was a different point at which the investor should have first 
acquired this knowledge. Third, the tribunal must determine when the 
claimant acquired, or should have acquired, knowledge that it incurred a loss 
as a result of the breach. 
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The tribunal in Feldman v. Mexico considered the meaning of Articles 
1116 and 1117 in its Interim Decision on Preliminary Jurisdictional Issues 
and in its Final Award.
274
 The discussion in the Interim Decision focused on 
the definition of ―making a claim‖ for the purpose of determining the cut-off 
date for the limitation period.
275
 The tribunal‘s analysis on this issue fully 
supports the applicability of the three-year limitations period and does not 
touch on continuing acts. Though UPS v. Canada cited Feldman for the 
proposition that continuing acts can overcome NAFTA‘s three-year 
limitations period,
276
 Feldman in no way supports this contention.  
The UPS tribunal confused Feldman‟s holding on jurisdiction over acts 
beginning before but continuing after NAFTA‘s entry into force for a 
decision about jurisdiction over acts outside the three-year time limitation. 
Section IV of the Feldman Interim Decision covers ―Time Limitation‖ and 
does not discuss continuing acts.
277
 Later, in Section VI, the tribunal 
addressed the ―Relevance of Claims Pre-Dating NAFTA‘s Entry into 
Force.‖278 In this discussion the tribunal addressed how continuing acts 
interact with NAFTA‘s subject matter exclusion ratione temporis: 
Since NAFTA . . . delivers the only normative framework within 
which the Tribunal may exercise its jurisdictional authority, the scope 
of application of NAFTA in terms of time defines also the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal ratione temporis. Given that NAFTA came into force 
on January 1, 1994, no obligations adopted under NAFTA existed, 
and the Tribunal‘s jurisdiction does not extend, before that date.279  
The tribunal then reasoned that continuing actions may become breaches of 
NAFTA after the treaty‘s entry into force.280 This discussion is completely 
separate from the application of NAFTA‘s period of limitation, which acts as 
a further bar to jurisdiction ratione temporis.  
The Feldman tribunal added two questions to the merits: (1) whether the 
limitations period should be suspended for the period in which the parties had 
allegedly temporarily reached an agreement remedying the situation, and (2) 
whether the respondent should be equitably estopped from invoking any 
 
 
 274. Feldman, supra note 44, Award, ¶¶ 53–65; id., Interim Decision on Preliminary 
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 276. See United Parcel Service of America v. Canada, Award, ¶¶ 27–29 (June 11, 2007). 
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 279. Id. ¶ 62. 
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limitation period because it assured the claimant that the situation would be 
resolved and remedied.
281
 In the Final Award, it found that no suspension of 
the period of limitation was warranted and that the respondent was not 
estopped from invoking the three-year limitation period.
282
  
Though the investor in Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada cited the 
Feldman Final Award in support of its contention that continuing acts 
overcome the limitation period,
283
 the decision says no such thing. To the 
contrary, Feldman states unequivocally that ―NAFTA Articles 1117(2) and 
1116(2) introduce a clear and rigid limitation defense which, as such, is not 
subject to any suspension, prolongation or other qualification.‖284 The 
Merrill & Ring investor ignored this language and Feldman‘s entire 
discussion of the limitation period and turned to the decision on the merits of 
Feldman‘s discriminatory treatment claim.285 In the paragraph quoted by 
Merrill, Feldman finds the ―[c]laimant has been effectively denied [tax] 
rebates for the April 1996 through November 1997 period, while domestic 
export trading companies have been given rebates . . . .‖286 The period of 
limitation cutoff in Feldman was April 30, 1996, while the rebates were 
―effectively denied‖ over a period beginning before April 30.287 The apparent 
contradiction of these dates is the basis for Merrill‘s argument that the 
Feldman tribunal accepted jurisdiction over a continuing act beginning 
before the period of limitation.
288
 However, this interpretation is incorrect. 
The measure through which Feldman was ―effectively denied‖ these rebates 
occurred in 1998, after the Mexican tax authority audited Feldman‘s 
company and demanded that it repay the rebates received during this 
period.
289
 The measure at issue thus occurred well within the period of 
limitation and does not support an expansion of the period of limitation 
through continuing acts. 
In Mondev v. United States, the United States invoked the NAFTA period 
of limitation, arguing that Mondev was aware of the alleged breaches more 
than three years before it filed its claim, and thus had sat on its rights. The 
United States‘ contention was that Mondev knew or should have been aware 
of the breaches when the City of Boston‘s actions that formed the basis of the 
 
 
 281. Feldman, Interim Decision, ¶ 48–49. 
 282. Feldman, Final Award, ¶¶ 58, 63. 
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 284. Feldman, Final Award, ¶ 63 (citation omitted). 
 285. Merrill & Ring, Investor Submission, ¶ 468 n.526 (citing and quoting Feldman, Final Award, 
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complaint occurred.
290
 These actions included allegedly obstructing 
Mondev‘s execution of its option to purchase a parcel of land and threatening 
to take measures that would render previously agreed-upon development of 
the land unviable.
291
  
Mondev, in turn, put forth a continuing acts argument, alleging that:  
[T]he breaches did not occur until the decisions of the United States 
courts which finally failed to give [Mondev] any redress; alternatively, 
until those decisions, Mondev was not in a position to be sure whether 
it had suffered loss. Thus it was not until those decisions that Mondev 
―first acquired, or should have first acquired . . . knowledge that the 
investor has incurred loss or damage.‖292  
Though the tribunal found the claims barred on other grounds, it asserted that 
it ―would not have accepted Mondev‘s argument that it could not have 
‗knowledge of . . . loss or damage‘ arising from the . . . [other claims until] 
the court decisions.‖293 It reasoned that ―[a] claimant may know that it has 
suffered loss or damage even if the extent or quantification of the loss or 
damage is still unclear.‖294  
In Grand River Enterprises v. United States, the tribunal heard a NAFTA 
claim by a Native American tribe in the cigarette business against the United 
States, arising out of various state actions undertaken as part of a Master 
Settlement Agreement (―MSA‖) to settle lawsuits against tobacco 
manufacturers.
295
 The MSA required states to enact legislation requiring non-
participating tobacco manufacturers to place a portion of their sales in escrow 
in a state-administered account.
296
 States enacted the legislation, which 
described in detail the portion of sales to be escrowed, the length of time the 
funds would be escrowed, and a requirement that the funds be escrowed by 
April 15th of the year following the year in which the cigarettes were sold.
297
 
Within a few years, in response to market adjustments to the MSA and 
escrow legislation, states intensified efforts to enforce their escrow laws and 
began enacting complementary legislation to strengthen enforcement of 
escrow laws and close a perceived loophole in the laws.
298
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The tribunal rejected Grand River‘s contention that it did not incur loss 
until it paid funds into the escrow accounts, finding that ―becoming subject to 
a clear and precisely quantified statutory obligation to place funds in an 
unreachable escrow for 25 years . . . is to incur loss or damage as those terms 
are ordinarily understood,‖ and that Grand River should have known it faced 
loss or damage prior to March 12, 2001 (the date marking three years before 
it brought its claim).
299
 On this basis, the tribunal held that Grand River‘s 
claims with respect to ―the MSA, the escrow statutes, any related measures 
and enforcement actions taken prior to [that date]‖ were time-barred by 
NAFTA Articles 1116 and 1117.
300
 
However, the tribunal considered related state actions after March 12, 
2001 separately and found that they were not time-barred.
301
 This may very 
well be the right result, but the reasoning is unsound. The tribunal‘s 
continuing dispute discussion is baffling. Quoting the PCIJ‘s ―real cause‖ 
analysis from Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, the tribunal 
appears to have reasoned that even if the state actions after March 12, 2001 
were related to the time-barred actions, this would not bar claims based on 
the later actions if the later actions gave rise to a separate dispute: ―while ‗a 
dispute may presuppose the existence of some prior situation or fact . . . it 
does not follow that the dispute arises in regard to the situation or fact.‘‖302 
After quoting this reasoning, the tribunal undertook no analysis of whether 
there was one ongoing dispute or a series of separate disputes. Since NAFTA 
Articles 1116(2) and 1117(2) do not reference ―disputes‖ at all, one wonders 
how the disputes reasoning is relevant.  
The tribunal misapplied the reasoning of Electricity Company of Sofia 
and Bulgaria, which addressed a continuing act in the context of acts 
beginning before entry into force, not a period of limitation. The PCIJ in that 
case was concerned with a provision limiting jurisdiction to acts after entry 
into force because the purpose of the treaty was to guide future conduct. It 
made sense there to hone in on whether the behavior giving rise to the 
dispute was completed—and thus not susceptible to alteration by treaty 
provisions—or continuing. Its analysis, however, was irrelevant to the period 
of limitation question considered by the Grand River tribunal.  
Perhaps the tribunal was trying to get at whether a new action is 
significantly distinct in some way from a previous action so that it can 
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constitute a new breach, or whether it is a mere continuation of a previous 
breach. This idea is captured by the term ―measure‖ in NAFTA. Article 201 
defines ―measure‖ as including ―any law, regulation, procedure, requirement 
or practice.‖303 NAFTA Chapter 11 ―applies to measures adopted or 
maintained by a Party relating to: (a) investors of another Party; (b) 
investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the Party; and (c) 
with respect to Articles 1106 and 1114, all investments in the territory of the 
Party.‖304 Since Chapter 11 applies to measures, investors may challenge 
only measures under this chapter.
305
 
The measure is useful for elucidating an important distinction between 
acts that may constitute breaches and those that may not. As Reisman has 
explained, a set of regulations setting out how a law or policy will be 
implemented ―fall squarely within the class of legal phenomena designated 
as ‗a measure‘; a routine application of one of those phenomena would 
not.‖306 This conclusion follows logically from the NAFTA definition of 
measure. It would strain the ordinary meaning of the terms to consider each 
individual application of a regulation ―a law, regulation, procedure, 
requirement or practice.‖307 NAFTA considers a ―measure‖ to be the 
implementation of a new law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice 
as a whole, rather than each discrete instance of its application. 
This ordinary-reading interpretation of ―measure‖ comports with the 
primary purpose of NAFTA‘s period of limitation, which is to promote 
certainty. If each routine application of a particular practice constituted a 
measure that could be challenged under Chapter 11, the period of limitation 
would be eviscerated, and even decades-old regulations would be subject to 
challenge. States and the actors in their economies would always face this 
added risk of upheaval.  
The use of the measure concept to distinguish actions that can reset the 
limitation period from those that cannot also has appeal on grounds of 
fairness. It is unlikely that a mere routine application of a measure would 
―fundamentally change [the claimant‘s] situation and [inflict] new and 
significant injury,‖ as the claimant asserted that the later legislation and 
enforcement policies did.
308
 It would seem unfair to time-bar a claim based 
on a state action that caused such an upheaval to an investor‘s situation if the 
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upheaval was unforeseen. Since a routine application of a measure will 
generally be foreseeable, a sophisticated investor should be able to estimate 
within the three-year window the loss it will occur from ongoing routine 
applications of the measure. Thus investors should generally be able to bring 
any claims within this period. It would seem that an unforeseen new 
substantial injury would tend to be caused only by a change in practice or a 
fundamentally altered application of a regulation, which would constitute a 
measure under NAFTA and thus fall within a new period of limitations. 
Keeping in mind the measure as the unit of action to which NAFTA 
applies, we can see how the Grand River tribunal‘s determination that the 
actions after March 2001 were not time-barred was perhaps correct. These 
actions should not be time-barred if they amounted to measures and not mere 
routine application of pre-existing measures.  
In United Parcel Service v. Canada, Canada objected that NAFTA 
Articles 1116 and 1117 barred UPS‘s claims.309 UPS argued that ―on-going 
conduct constitutes a new violation of NAFTA each day so that, for purposes 
of the time bar, the three year period begins anew each day.‖310 Canada 
countered by pointing that a rule that a continuing course of conduct 
constitutes a new breach each day would completely undermine the goals of 
certainty and finality.
311
  
The tribunal agreed with UPS, holding that the claims are not time-barred 
because ―continuing courses of conduct constitute continuing breaches of 
legal obligations and renew the limitation period accordingly.‖312 It 
distinguished Mondev on the grounds that the actions in that case were 
completed—the actions did not become continuing acts by virtue of the 
pending state court challenges.
313
  
At first glance, UPS‘s argument that a continuing act should extend the 
limitation period with each new application has intuitive appeal. UPS argued 
―on the basis of logic . . . that an investor cannot know whether a NAFTA 
Party will continue the conduct that constitutes an alleged breach before the 
Party determines whether it will end or continue the conduct.‖314 Though the 
tribunal did not elaborate on UPS‘s logic, it might have proceeded as follows. 
An investor may first learn of some action by a state that it considers a 
violation; at this point, the investor may even know that the action will cause 
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some loss. However, in the cost-benefit analysis of whether to initiate a 
claim, the party may at that point determine that the expense and time are not 
worth it given the seriousness of the conduct at issue and the estimated loss. 
If the conduct continues, the party may suffer a greater loss, leading to a 
different result from the cost-benefit analysis. It would be unfair to preclude a 
party from bringing a claim at this later time given the new information it has 
about the continuing nature of the conduct and the change in its expected 
loss.  
This logic ignores the purpose of the limitation period, as Canada pointed 
out.
315
 A reading that resets the limitation period with each new application 
of a regulation eviscerates the limitation. Also, as explained above, 
sophisticated international investors should be able to estimate their losses 
from a new regulation or policy within the three-year window. If a new state 
action truly causes unforeseen losses, it will likely fall within the definition 
of a measure and thus begin a new limitation period. 
Merrill & Ring Forestry v. Canada is the most recent NAFTA arbitration 
in which continuing acts were invoked to overcome the three-year limitation 
period. The tribunal did not reach the temporal jurisdiction issues because it 
found the claims failed on other grounds.
316
 However, this is unlikely to be 
the end of this line of argument; NAFTA investment tribunals will continue 
to grapple with it. 
E. Should Investment Arbitral Tribunals Borrow Continuing 
Circumstances Analysis to Overcome the NAFTA Period of Limitation? 
The reasoning of NAFTA investment tribunals on this issue has been 
poor. They have egregiously misapplied previous decisions. They have 
adopted the reasoning from decisions on whether pre-treaty circumstances 
should fall within jurisdiction, and applied this reasoning to the distinct issue 
of acts beginning outside the period of limitation. As this paper has shown, 
jurisdictional exclusion of pre-treaty circumstances is based on rationales 
entirely distinct from periods of limitation.  
At least one NAFTA tribunal, in UPS v. Canada, appears to have 
accepted as general rules of international law rules propounded by human 
rights bodies absent any reasoning.
317
 In the recent case Merrill & Ring 
Forestry, the investor offered human rights cases to support its contention 
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that continuing acts overcome the period of limitation.
318
 Though the tribunal 
did not reach the issue because it denied the claim on other grounds,
319
 this 
argument will likely be pressed again. Because the human rights cases do not 
offer reasons for their position on this issue, investment tribunals should not 
adopt their holdings. Tribunals must look to the purposes of the NAFTA 
period of limitation and derogate from it only when doing so comports with 
those purposes. 
There may be appropriate reasons to derogate from the period of 
limitation. The one that appears in prior jurisprudence is where the claimant 
is not to blame for failing to bring a claim on time. It may be argued that this 
was the case in Feldman, where Mexico allegedly assured the investor that 
the situation would be remedied.
320
 However, it is less likely in the 
international investment context than in other contexts that a claimant will 
have a good reason for sitting on its rights. Unlike early arbitrations 
involving individuals and Native American tribes dependent on states to 
press their claims,
321
 the actors in the international investment regime are 
large, sophisticated business enterprises which, by virtue of their 
participation in the regime, have access to adjudication to remedy harms they 
suffer.  
V. CONCLUSION  
Investment arbitral tribunals are authorized by the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, the ICSID Convention, and often by individual BITs to 
look to outside sources of international law. There are no clear limitations on 
which outside sources arbitrators should apply, except that they should apply 
only those that are relevant to the BIT at issue and be mindful of differences 
in jurisdictional consent.  
Because ICSID jurisdiction is based on consent, tribunal overreach 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of the investment protection legal regime. The 
regime‘s characterization as facing a ―crisis of legitimacy‖322 and ―an 
incumbent lack of transparency, differentiation, partial contradiction and 
legal uncertainty‖323 raise the importance of maintaining and restoring its 
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perceived competence and fairness. As Jan Paulsson observed early in the 
investment arbitration regime‘s history, whether national governments agree 
to participate depends on ―the degree of sophistication shown by arbitrators 
when called upon to pass judgment on governmental actions. . . . A single 
incident of an adventurist arbitrator going beyond the proper scope of his 
jurisdiction in a sensitive case may be sufficient to generate a backlash.‖324 
Even perceived overreach or arbitrariness can undermine the credibility of 
the international investment protection system: ―[I]nternational legal regimes 
depend for their survival on perceptions of legitimacy . . . . To generate 
perceptions of legitimacy, legal regimes must operate predictably, conform to 
historical practice, and incorporate fundamental values shared by the 
governed community.‖325  
When they enter into investment treaties, states obligate themselves ―to 
participate in potential arbitrations in an as-yet-unknown scope and against 
as-yet-unknown claimants.‖326 If they believe they face unpredictable 
liability, states may withdraw from the regime or decline to enter into more 
BITs.
327
 Indeed, many states have recently re-examined their involvement in 
the international investment arbitration system. In 2007, Venezuela 
terminated its BIT with the Netherlands, and Ecuador declared it would 
withdraw from its investment treaties.
328
 Ecuador threatened to terminate its 
BIT with the United States. Subsequently, the foreign minister retracted the 
threat, but insisted the country would rethink its participation.
329
 Ecuador has 
since withdrawn consent to arbitrate disputes over natural resources.
330
 
Bolivia withdrew from ICSID completely in May 2007, citing ICSID‘s 
alleged bias in favor of corporations. Bolivia also announced its intention to 
revise its twenty-four BITs, specifically to make changes to the provisions 
concerning the scope of covered investments.
331
 The recent Philippines-Japan 
Agreement does not provide for investor-state arbitration of disputes.
332
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Additionally, a number of countries have publicly decried the investment 
legal regime. A Philippine government official reportedly claimed investor-
state arbitration was biased in favor of developed countries.
333
 ―Argentina, 
unable to cope with the sheer number of proceedings brought against it, has 
even gone so far as to announce its desire to return to the Calvo doctrine, 
whereby foreigners are to be subjected to no more favourable treatment than 
locals and, particularly, are to exhaust local judicial remedies.‖334 Pakistan‘s 
Attorney General questioned, in light of an arbitration filed by Société 
Générale de Surveillance S.A., ―whether states should continue to enter into 
BITs given what he described as the open-ended concepts contained in the 
agreements along with the significant policy considerations involved.‖335  
Sornarajah attributes these negative reactions to the investment regime to 
expansionary trends in jurisdiction.
336
 Menaker argues that states enter into 
cost-benefit analyses when deciding whether to participate in the 
international investment legal regime.
337
 BITs offer states the benefit of 
signaling that they are protective of foreign investment and thereby attract it. 
The state‘s costs may include, in addition to the obvious costs of defending a 
case before an arbitration tribunal and the possibility of losing, the cost of 
initial policy adjustments to comply with substantive obligations.
338
 Another 
cost is reputational cost if a state is found to have violated its obligations.
339
  
However, Menaker points out that a state‘s perceived cost of losing an 
arbitration will be lower if the state believes the tribunal interpreted and 
applied the BIT accurately, particularly if the state believes a similar result 
would have obtained in a domestic court: ―[s]tates will undoubtedly monitor 
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whether the obligations imposed on them by arbitral tribunals are 
coterminous with the obligations they believe they have undertaken. Their 
view of the benefits and costs of the BIT will unquestionably be shaped by 
this assessment.‖340  
It is therefore important that decisions are well reasoned, consistent, and 
clear as to how their jurisdictional interpretations relate to the consent 
evidenced in the BIT. This is particularly true when a tribunal draws from 
reasoning in other international law contexts like human rights law. The 
increasing prominence of human rights in all areas of international law 
makes it likely that investors and host states will press human rights 
principles and cases with increasing frequency in investment arbitration.
341
 
As this happens, it may become difficult to cabin which issues human rights 
principles should be applied to and which they should not.  
Arbitrators may properly look to human rights or other decisions on 
jurisdictional issues as far as these decisions offer persuasive analysis that 
can be applied to the BIT and facts at issue. ―Like cases must be treated 
alike,‖ but more importantly, ―appropriate, substantiated distinctions need to 
be drawn, rather than relying on arbitrary, formalistic factors as a basis of 
differentiation.‖342 It is appropriate for investment tribunals to use relevant 
sources of international law, including persuasive reasoning drawn from 
prior decisions in human rights and other areas of international law, because 
these sources provide context for interpreting treaty language. However, 
arbitrators should borrow from prior decisions based on the strength of the 
reasoning of those decisions and on the similarity of the underlying treaties, 
always remembering that their role is to discern the intention of the parties.  
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